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ABSTRACT
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Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Gareth

Matthews

B.

In a series of publications, Robert Stalnaker and

Hartry Field have undertaken

a

dispute about what is the

correct way to explain intentionality naturalistically

Field wishes to assimilate mental intentionality to

linguistic intentionality and to explain both kinds of

intentionality using Tarskian truth theory plus the causal
theory of reference.

Stalnaker wishes to subsume mental

intentionality under the notion of indication and to explain
it on the model of measurement theory,

leaving linguistic

intentionality to be explained derivatively.

I

attempt to

adjudicate their dispute, paying particular attention to the

question whether Tarskian truth theory has

a

role to play in

explaining intentionality naturalistically.
The first half of the dissertation examines Tarski's
theory.

I

argue that Field and Stalnaker are incorrect when

they agree that Tarski's reduction of the notion of truth is

defective and
truth.

I

explain Tarski's 'structural' notion of

In the second half of the dissertation,

v

I

argue that

Stalnaker

s

criticisms of Field mostly do not stand up to

scrutiny, but that Field's theory is unsatisfactory

nonetheless;

I

also argue that certain criticisms of

Stalnaker do more damage than he thinks.

I

conclude that

neither has solved 'the problem of intentionality

'

,

but that

Stalnaker is right that truth theory as such will not have
role in the correct solution.

vi

a
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

In the early nineteen-seventies, Stalnaker (following

Lewis) said that belief was a functional state, and Field

said that a materialistically adequate reduction of the

notion of truth would not consist only in a Tarskian truth

characterization
a

,

as Tarski supposed, but would also contain

physicalistic theory of denotation such as the causal

theory.

From these two apparently unrelated points,

Stalnaker and Field were set on a collision course.

The two

claims had these things in common: they were each at least
in part about an intentional phenomenon (belief on the one

hand and meaning, broadly construed, on the other) and each
author was interested in providing
his phenomenon.

a

naturalistic account of

Each author also thought he could

generalize his view.

Field made the first move toward

generalization: in a paper called 'Mental Representation'
[1978], he argued that mental representation was to be

understood on the model of linguistic representation and

hypothesized

a

language of thought.

Linguistic

representation was construed in terms of physicalistic
denotation plus a Tarskian truth characterization.

He

proposed an account of one mental intentional relation
belief- using this model.

He also attacked the

-

2

functionalists' approach to belief, arguing that it
did not
give an account of intentionality
In the first two
.

chapters of his book Inquiry

,

Stalnaker took up the

challenge, attacking Field's theory and proposing a

model for understanding intentionality

naturalistically

— the

measurement model.

He gave, in turn,

his own account of belief, one adhering to this model and
one according to which belief is a functional state.

He

also said that Tarskian truth theory has no role to play in

explaining intentionality as such and proposed
role for it.
on Stalnaker

a

peripheral

Then it was Field's turn again: in a symposium
's

book, he attacked Stalnaker

's

account of

belief specifically and argued that his own approach to

intentionality was in general preferable to Stalnaker
Stalnaker again replied.
[1986], and Field,

[1972],

(See Stalnaker [1976a],

[1978],

's.

[1984],

[1981], 1986b].)

My aim in this dissertation is to evaluate this
dispute, keeping a particularly attentive eye on the

question whether Tarskian truth theory has
explaining intentionality.
introduce the issues.

a role

to play in

In the present chapter,

In Chapters Two and Three,

I

I

present

Tarski's theory of truth, criticisms by Field and others,
and

I

reply to the criticisms;

I

argue that Field was wrong

in thinking that Tarski's reduction was inadequate, and

explain Tarski's 'structural' concept of truth.
Four,

I

In Chapter

present Field's theory of representation and

Stalnaker

's

I

criticisms of it, arguing that Stalnaker

's

3

criticisms mostly miss their mark, but that Field's view

nonetheless defective.
Stalnaker

s

In Chapter Five,

I

is

present

view, Field's criticisms, and some replies from

Stalnaker, arguing that certain criticisms do more damage

than Stalnaker thinks and that his view has other problems
as well.

I

conclude that neither has solved "the problem of

intentionality "

,

but that Stalnaker is right that truth

theory as such will not have

a

role in the correct answer.

Field's and Stalnaker

According to Field,

a

's

Theories

"materialistically adequate

account" of intentional relations must show them not to be
"

irreducibly mental" relations.

(Cf.

He

[1978], p.78.)

thinks he can produce such an account for belief and desire.
It is only belief that he discusses in any detail.

The

central strategy is to conceive of belief and desire as

"attitudes toward meaningful sentences in

a

internal representation" ([1978], p.98).

Roughly, the idea

system of

is to break the belief relation into two parts, belief* and

meaning.

Belief* is a relation that holds between

and a sentence of an internal language.

a

person

Schematically put,

X believes that P iff for some sentence S of X's system of

internal representation, X believes*

S and S

means that

P.

This proposal will only be materialistically adequate
if

'S

means that

P'

can be given a materialistically

4

adequate explication, and here is where Tarski comes
in.
Meaning is explicated in terms of truth conditions.
Field
gives two theories, one for the friends of propositions,

the

other for the enemies of propositions.

construed as

a set

A proposition is

of worlds, and a sentence thus means the

set of worlds at which it is true.

The concept of a

sentence being true at a world needs to be defined, and the

main ingredient of the definition is
characterization.

a

Tarskian truth-

Other ingredients are the notions of

names denoting objects, predicates standing for properties,
and actuality.

For Field, materialistic adequacy requires

that there be no mysterious relations to other worlds, and
thus the base clause of

a

truth characterization must be

given using the notions of denotation in the actual world
and standing for in the actual world, as follows:
'P(b)' is true at w iff there is an object x that
b denotes (in the actual world) and a property Z
that P stands for (in the actual world), and w is
a world in which x exists and has Z
([1978, p.86).

Field's own preference is to do away with propositions,
and he renders the second version of the proposal in the

following words.

(This quotation comes from a section of

[1978] that occurs after Field has gotten tired of his

asterisk and started using 'believe* instead of
'believe*

'

.

) :

...let us say that a person 'believes that £'
(where 'p' abbreviates an English sentence S) if
that person believes some sentence in his system
of internal representation whose translation
([1978], p.97)
into English is S.

5

In a shift familiar from the work of Quine,
the notion of

translation takes over the work of the notion of
meaning.
Field says that the notion of translation involved

is to be

loose and sloppy' and 'indeterminate'

([1978], p.97).

Over all, the strategy is to use the concepts of

language and meaning as a paradigm to explicate the

intentional relations, belief and desire.

A relation such

as belief* which holds between a person and a token
is

deemed not to be problematic from

a

materialist point of

The concept of meaning is then analyzed further or

view.

done away with in favor of the notion of translation.

Field

does not comment on intentional relations other than belief
and desire (and meaning), but presumably he thinks this

method would work for other propositional attitudes as well.
Stalnaker announces that he is looking for
'naturalistic explanation' of intentionality

.

a

Inquiry is

mostly concerned with the intentionality of certain mental
states rather than with linguistic intentionality.

Stalnaker characterizes his project as follows:
am mainly concerned with one specific kind of
fact about belief and other mental states, the
fact... that such states stand in intentional or
representational relations. What I want to explain
in naturalistic terms is the nature of such
relations.
([1986], p.114)
I

On Stalnaker

's

view, mental intentionality is prior to

linguistic intentionality and is explained differently.

For

the purpose of explaining certain mental relations (one of

which is belief), Stalnaker introduces the measurement
model.

He thinks that the relation between, say, a person

6

and the number that indicates his weight is
straightforward

and unmysterious, and he seeks a similar account
to take the
mystery out of relations between persons and the
rather

abstract items we know as propositions.
that will associate

persons

,

a

He seeks an account

range of possible properties of

e.g. beliefs, with a range of propositions much in

the way that measurement theory associates a range of

possible properties of persons, e.g. weights, with a range
of numbers.
In the case of belief,

it is the theory of Dretske and

Stampe that will do this: Stalnaker sees representation as

kind of indication.

Following them, he defines

a

a

representational system as "a system that is capable of
being in

a

range of alternative states that tend to

correlate with and be caused by, a corresponding set of

alternative states of the world" ([1986], p.116).
(in [1986])

(Schiffer

calls this the 'fuel gauge model' of

representation.

)

Tree rings and weather cycles provide an

example of a representational system? so does mental
representation.

The explanatory force of this conception

does not come from truth conditional correlation, but still
from a correlation, of a different kind.

For Stalnaker, mental intentionality is independent of

linguistic intentionality and prior to it. His conception of
linguistic intentionality is based on some ideas of Lewis,

which ultimately derive from Grice [1957].
broad outlines as follows:

He sketches its

7

One might begin an explanation of the semantic
relation between a sentence S and a proposition
x by explaining what it is for a speaker to mean
x by uttering S.
Then one might go on to explain
what it is for a sentence S to mean x in terms of
the existence of a convention in a population of
speakers that S should be used to mean x. Conventions are to be explained in terms of the
P at terns of beliefs and intentions of the members of the population.
([1984], p.32)
He endorses a version of Lewis's idea that the convention is
one of 'truthfulness and trust'.

(Cf.

[Lewis, 1975].)

In rejecting Field's theory, Stalnaker makes a special

point of rejecting the idea that

Tarskian truth

a

characterization has any role to play in explaining
intentionality naturalistically
like this.

One is asking for

a

He conceives the issues

.

solution to 'the problem of

intentionality' for external language when one asks 'What

physical (or sociological or psychological) facts constitute
the fact that sentence S expresses the proposition x
[1984], p.32).

and

A further and different question is how

(cf.
S

came to stand in that relation, whatever it turns out

x

to be

?'

.

A Tarskian truth characterization contributes to the

correct answer to the second question, but not the first.
So,

there is

a

question about intentionality to which

Tarskian truth theory can make

a

contribution, according to

Stalnaker, but it is a question about linguistic

intentionality only and not one that has any direct bearing
on 'the problem of intentionality'.

The question is, how

did those sentences and those propositions come to stand in

the relation means that

?

established and persisted.

Well,

a

convention was

The continuing presence of a

)
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convention is explained by appeal to the concepts
of
precedent and imitation. And, says Stalnaker,
[t]o explain the rich and flexible set of
conventions which constitute the fact that a
population speaks and understands a language, one
must find a small finite number of basic
conventions which it is plausible to believe
could be sustained by precedent, imitation, and
explicit teaching, but which together have a large,
possible infinite set of deductive consequences
the form S is used to mean x"
This, of course,
is just what a compositional semantic theory such
as a Tarskian truth characterization provides.
.

([1984]. p 33
.

Sorting Out Some Issues

Three concepts of interest to our authors are mental
states, intensionality, and intentionality.
'mental state',

The terms

'intentionality', and 'intensionality' are

all quas i-technical and are used in different ways by

different authors.

There is thus no question of trying to

give 'the' definition or analysis of these concepts.

It

would be nice to be able just to list stipulative
definitions or criteria for these concepts given by the
various authors, but these are missing.

There is an issue

one could take to be philosophical not very far below the

surface: the problem of how to classify the various

phenomena known as mental, intensional and intentional, in

a

way that is useful and takes account of the affinities

between them.

What

I

propose to do here is present

a simple

and relatively primitive classification of the phenomena so

.

9

as to get a handle on them.

The three concepts converge in

sentences of the form that so interests our authors,

believes that p'.

'X

This simple classification scheme will

show to what extent they diverge elsewhere.

Mental States

For present purposes, we will assume that all mental
states have subjects.

Let's say that a concept C is mental

if C is instantiated, then it follows that some

thinker (s) and thought (s) exist, and it does not follow that
any contingent thing exists other than thinkers and

thoughts.

(

'Thought' here is intended broadly, so that it

covers events, states and processes of thought.
it does not mean

'object of thought'.)

Obviously

A concept C is

quasi-mental iff, if C is instantiated, then it follows that
some thinkers and thoughts exist and also that some

contingent thing other than thinkers and thoughts exists.
Let's call mental and quasi-mental concepts

'

mentalistic

'

A concept C is non-mentalistic iff, if C is instantiated,
the existence of thinkers and thoughts is not entailed.

(These biconditionals are meant as classif icational

criterial.

As criteria, they would be circular.

,

not

Also,

ignore the problem of the various kinds of compounds of

contingent objects and sets of contingent objects.

The

biconditionals could be fixed up to accommodate them, if

I
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necessary.)

Examples of mental states: belief that,
hope

that, desire that,

intention that, expectation that, feeling
that, feeling happy, seeking.
Examples of quasi-mental
states, seeing, voting (individual
and group), attributing
to,
a

intentionally stabbing, and, perhaps, an object's
having
purpose.
Examples of non-mentalistic states:
falling,

aging, weighing such-and-such.

Some controversial states:

meaning, reference, representation, indication,
aboutness.

Intensionality

Intensionality belongs to expressions of
rather than concepts.

a

language

Two things standardly taken to

indicate the presence of intensionality are failure of

existential generalization ('failure of EG') and failure of
substitution.

These tests apply to natural language and

their use produces useful but pr ima facie generalizations.

There are different kinds of substitution and

existential generalization.
By

'substitution'

coextensive names.

I

I

will not discuss them all.

will here mean substitution of
By 'EG',

generalization on a name.

I

will here mean existential

Definite descriptions, indefinite

descriptions, and coextensive predicates present special

problems of their own.

(

Pre-analytically

,

it is rather

unclear what shall count as substitution and EG for natural
language.

I

rely on the standard examples.)

I

also assume
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for present purposes that a name not in an
intensional

context must refer in order for the sentence to be
true.

Failure of substitution and failure of EG do not always
go together.

Let's say an expression is strongly

intensional iff both fail (in its scope), weakly intensional
if one or the other but not both fails,

intensional if one

or the other or both fails, and non-intensional if neither

Let's also define a special concept, c-

fails.

intens ionality (after Chisholm, whose idea this is (see
[1967])):

a

sentence-embedding expression is c-intensional

iff the result of embedding any sentence in it is a

contingent sentence.
Both EG and substitution fail for 'believes that'
so it is thought).

(or

Only EG fails for 'is thinking about':

'Mary is thinking about The Scarlet Pimpernel' does not

entail

'Something exists such that Mary is thinking about
In the presence of the sentence

it'.

Bush',

'Mary is thinking about Poppy Bush' entails

thinking about George Bush'.
'about'

'Poppy Bush is George

Constructions involving

in general seem to be more transparent than

counterparts involving 'that': compare 'has
and

'Mary is

a

belief about'

'thinks about' with 'believes that' and 'thinks that'.
If we use the adverb 'intentionally', we can produce

cases for which substitution and not EG fails.

'Mary

intentionally stabbed Mark Twain' does not in the presence
of

'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' entail

stabbed Samuel Clemens'

.

'Mary intentionally

However, since one does not stab

12

what does not exist, it does entail 'There exists
something
such that Mary intentionally stabbed it'.
This claim
applies to sentences containing other adverbs as
well, e.g.
'happily'.
it is sometimes claimed that there are
veridical
and non-veridical senses of 'remembers'; if there
is a

veridical sense, then 'Mary remembers that Mark Twain lived
in Hartford', taken in the veridical sense, provides another

example of this type.
Finally, neither substitution nor EG fails for 'Mary

saw George’ and 'Mary saw George run'.

These entail 'There

exists something Mary saw', and, in the presence of 'George
is Poppy'

they entail respectively 'Mary saw Poppy' and

'Mary saw Poppy run

1

.

(These observations are of course

derived from Barwise and Perry [1983].)
We should note that much more baroque and subtle

classifications could be constructed if we considered other
types of substitution and existential generalization.

Also

we might keep in mind that inasmuch as all this is evidence

about logical form, it is prima facie evidence.

On one

approach to the semantics of propositional attitude verbs,
all the above substitutions in fact go through, although

there are pragmatic difficulties about stating the
inferences.

If this approach is correct, the above

distinctions collapse, and all we are left with is

a

bipartite classification: those expressions for which EG
fails and those for which it does not.

And if the logic of

English should turn out to be free, the bipartite

.
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classification collapses, too, and we would need
to start
afresh

Intentionality

Our third notion is intentionality.

It has been said

that intentionality is present where there is aboutness, or

representation, or directedness to an object.
these expressions
to') the

(

represents',

'is about',

'primitives of intentionality'.

analytically

,

Let's call
'is

directed

Speaking pre-

there seem to be two main kinds of

intentionality: that of thought and that of (external)
language: species of aboutness, representation or

directedness are found in the semantic notions of meaning
and reference, and other species relate to the realm of
thought, e.g. thinking of or having an image of.

mental life has an object:
not be about anything.

a

a

vague feeling of happiness need

Not all the workings of language

involve aboutness, either.

with

Not all

The imperative is coordinated

certain speech act, but is not about that speech act,

and perhaps not about anything.

The syntactic operation

that yields such sentences of the predicate calculus as 'Fa'
is coordinated,

in interpretation, with set membership, but

is not about set membership.

of' and

'e'

(The expressions

are about set membership.)

'is a

member

14

Let's say that a concept is intentional iff
necessarily
if it is instantiated,
(

something

existential).
intentional.

then some thing is about something

is intended to be schematic and not

A concept is non-intentional iff it is not
It seems that intentional items can be

(partially) ordered in that some represent more and
less

directly than others.

Let's say that a representation

more directly represents
b each represent x,
ci

a

thing x than b does iff (i)

a
a

and

(ii) necessarily if b represents x then

does, and (iii) it is not the case that necessarily if a

re P resen ^- s x then b does.

believes that George is

As an example, consider Sam, who

a spy

and who, as part of so doing,

has a representation of George.

His representation of

George more directly represents George than does his belief
about George.
This conception of intentionality is rather narrow.

Broader ones are available.

For example, according to a

tradition originating in Aristotle, aboutness is

a

special

case of a broader relation sometimes called 'signification'

which has epistemic content.

The trouble with these broader

conceptions in the present context is that they pronounce on
some of the questions which will be at issue.

The

underlying problem with which Field and Stalnaker are
concerned is, how exactly do we generalize about meaning and

representation?
not?

Must we appeal to mentalistic concepts or

?

:

15

Correlations

Our systems for classifying the phenomena are
extremely
crude, but they will serve to set the scene.
The following

claims are all false:

-Every mentalistic concept is expressed by an intensional
idiom.

-Every mental concept is expressed by an intensional idiom.
(Counterexample:

'Jones hurts'.)

—Intensional idioms express only mentalistic concepts.
-The presence of a propositional mental attitude can only be

reported in a strongly intensional idiom.

(Counterexample:

'Mary attributes wisdom to John').

However, the following claims appear to be true, or at
least defensible:
-If an expression is weakly intensional by failure of

substitution, it expresses a mentalistic concept.

-Except possibly for the primitives of intentionality

,

if an

expression is weakly intensional by failure of existential
generalization, it expresses a mentalistic concept.
(Brentano thought it was a mark of mental states that they

could be directed on objects that did not exist.)
-The primitives of intentionality are all weakly intensional

by failure of existential generalization.
The following claim made by Chisholm ([1967]) is

questionable, although it may be able to be defended in the
end

.

.
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-Every c-intensional expression expresses

a

mental concept.

Probability may seem to provide counterexamples;
Chisholm
says various things about probability.

Other possible

counterexamples involve related concepts, such as
causation
and concepts involving specially limited accessibility
relations
It is also not clear whether the following claims
are

true or false;

—Whenever there is intentionality,

a

mentalistic concept is

instantiated
-Necessarily, whenever there is intentionality

,

a

mentalistic concept is instantiated.
-Every concept such that if it is instantiated, then there
is intentionality,

is also such that it can be analyzed in

terms of non-intentional concepts.

-Linguistic intentionality is more basic than mental

intentionality (or vice versa).
The controversial claims are the interesting ones.

Is

it the case that when there is intentionality -aboutness-, a

mentalistic concept is instantiated

?

Is it necessarily so?

There are three main ways to say yes to the first question:
(1)

representation is always the result of purposive

activity,

(2)

representation is always representation for

someone, and (3) representation always involves coordination
of structure of representing items with represented items,

but of the many systems that might do this, one must be

chosen and used.

Here is one way to say no to the first

17

question: all representation is ultimately linguistic,
and
linguistic representation is truth-theoretic, which

conception does not involve minds. Here is another:

representation is just indication, which conception does
not
involve minds.

Some Questions and Some Desiderata

What should we demand of a 'naturalistic' theory of

intentionality ?

What do Field and Stalnaker demand?

Stalnaker and Field have slightly different aims, actually,

which leads to some misunderstanding.

I

am going to take

the high road here and simply list some questions their

theories can be taken to address instead of dissecting the

misunderstandings.

(The issue, or an issue, does get joined

most of the time.)

Later we will figure out whether the

theories address the questions successfully.

Stalnaker and Field have this much in common: they want
to show that intentional relations are amenable to empirical

study and not mysteriously outside the natural order.

Both

focus on belief, and both produce claims about belief that
are designed to serve a dual purpose.
(a)

Each author wishes

to present his naturalistic account of belief and (b) to

give an example of his general approach, showing how it is

supposed to work and that, in the instance of belief, it
does work.

Each produces an equivalence with

'S

believes
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that P

on the lefthand side.

But each has a slightly

different ambition concerning what shall appear on
the other
side.
Field's smaller goal is to have no mentalistic
notions appear, or at least to make it plausible
that none
are required.

His larger goal of course is to show how and

that his approach works in a specific instance.

Stalnaker's

smaller goal is to produce a correct equivalence making

belief both a functional notion and a species of the notion
of indication, which notion, he thinks, applies to phenomena

that do not involve minds.

His larger goal is to give an

example that makes convincing his claim that intentionality
can be explained on the model he proposes.
As we have seen, Stalnaker speaks of 'constitution' of

intentional facts, and of the 'nature' of representation.
Field speaks of giving an 'account'.

Schiffer in his

commentary on Stalnaker ([1986]) speaks about reduction, and
Field uses that word also.

However, both theories are so

sketchy that evaluating them as reductions of intentional to

physical notions would largely be an exercise in
speculation.

We will take the minimalist approach.

Let us say that a material biconditional gives an

account of a propositional attitude (such as belief-that)
iff it is true and has the form

S

[verb]s that p iff ....

and the sentence comprising the left side does not appear on

the right side.

We also say that the condition reported on

:
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the right in an account constitutes the
state described on
the left.
We also assume that by 'nature' Stalnaker
means
either logical or physical nature: that the
qualities in

question are either logically or physically necessary.
Here, then, are the main questions we will
be keeping
in mind:
(1)

Is there a mentalistic concept of which one
can give an

account without using other mentalistic concepts?
(2)

Is there a mentalistic intentional concept of which
one

can give an account without using other intentional

concepts ?
(3)

Is there a propositional mental concept of which one can

give an account without using intensional language?
We will also test assertions about 'the nature of

representation/ intentionality
question
(4)

(

s

'

by asking the following

)

Given the qualities that are logically (physically)

necessary to representation, can one give an account of

belief in terms of those qualities?

Here are the desiderata against which

Stalnaker

's

and Field's theories:

I

will measure

(1) the usual:

their

proposals must be coherent and ^over what they are supposed
to cover; for our purposes, they will be judged to have

covered 'what they are supposed to cover' if there is at
least one question above which gets a 'yes'.

(2)

there must

be some hope of showing belief continuous with other mental
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concepts, and not just propositional ones,
either; (3) the
treatment of belief must be consonant with
what is known
about the semantics of 'believes' and ought
not rule out

promising approaches;

(4)

the claim of a phy sicalistic

basis or analysis must be made plausible in some
way and not
merely asserted;
(5) the projected theory should be able to

decide at least some of the controversial cases and

questions we listed earlier

(

-what's a theory for?).
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CHAPTER II

TARSKI'S THEORY OF TRUTH

In his well-known paper ([1972]), Field takes
Tarski to

task for not having given a physicalistically
acceptable

definition of truth, despite claims to the contrary,
and
suggests an additional component for the theory to
remedy
its flaws.

The resulting theory is the basis for Field's

theories of meaning and representation generally.

In one of

their few points of agreement, Stalnaker accepts Field's

criticism of Tarski, and others have accepted it as well.
(Besides Stalnaker [1984], see Devitt [1984] and McDowell
[1980].)

In this chapter and the next

I

defend Tarski

against Field and other critics.
I

theory.

begin by presenting
I

a

simplified version of Tarski's

then present three classic criticisms of Tarski:

Field's, Putnam's and Davidson's.

criticisms of Putnam and Davidson.

Next,
I

I

answer the

then present three

attempts to defend Tarski against Field and argue that they
do not succeed.

In the next chapter,

I

present my own reply

to Field and further discussion of Tarski's theory.
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Tarski

1

s

Theory

Tarski was interested in the paradoxes
that could be
generated intuitively using such semantical
notions as
denotation, application, satisfaction, and truth.
He

wondered whether a consistent deductive theory
employing
these notions could be constructed. This was
half of the
impetus that resulted in his famous theory.

As a matter of

interest when constructing deductive theories, one tries
to
use as few primitives as possible and tries to
presuppose as

little as possible in the way of other theories.
the other half.

not only could

Tarski was led to
a

a

This was

startling discovery:

deductive theory containing the semantic

notions be given, the notions themselves could all be

defined in terms of just one of them, satisfaction, which
could in turn be defined using just the resources of logic
and set theory - in "purely logical" terms, as Tarski has
it.

That is to say, the notions of semantics, including

truth, could be defined without using any specifically

semantic primitives at all.

(Putnam suggests that this

should have been called the "Look No Semantics
of Truth".

See [1985], p. 63).

1

Conception

The only constraint that

emerges is that the metalanguage variables have to be of

higher order than the object language variables.

In an

article where he summarizes his results informally, Tarski
renders his main conclusion as follows:
It is possible to construct in the metalanguage
methodologically correct and materially adequate
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de f in itions of the semantical concepts
if and only
if the metalanguage is equipped with
variables of
lgher logical type than all the variables
of
language which is the subject of investigation.the
([1956], p. 406)
It is the right-to-left half of the
biconditional that makes

this statement so striking.

Tarski says, further, that

...the semantical concepts are defined in terms
of
the usual concepts of the metalanguage and
are thus
reduced to purely logical concepts, the concepts of
the language being investigated and the specific
concepts of the morphology of language. In this way
semantics becomes a part of the morphology of language if the latter in understood in a sufficiently
wide sense.
([1956], p.406)
By

'morphology of language' Tarski means the study of the

structure of language, and he is asserting that semantics
is

part of the study of the structure of language and that
truth (along with the other semantic concepts) is
of structure.

We are not yet in

a

a

matter

position to understand

what this might mean, but the explication of this idea will

concern us again below.

Tarski's interests converged with those of the logical

positivists (with whom he was associated), who had been
entertaining their own suspicions of the notion of truth.
They were of course sensitive to the threat of incoherence

emanating from the paradoxes; moreover,

'true'

the verif icationist turn of mind, otiose.

seemed, to

Once you had

verified 'Grass is green' (presumably by judicious sampling
and careful observation of color), you had verified '"Grass
is green" is true'; there was,

do.

There was

a

it seemed,

nothing left to

certain amount of feeling that 'true' ought

to be expunged from a 'scientifically correct' vocabulary.
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Tarski was able to provide an example of
a consistent
theory containing semantical notions and
one which showed
that 'true' was in

a

certain special sense otiose.

If you

have a language all of whose constants
are physicalistically
acceptable, then introducing a metalanguage
(for that
language) and defining metalinguistic truth
need not add

anything beyond what is already given in logic and
set
theory

-

not anything that should worry a physicalist.

The

positivists were thus given the means to consign
semantical ism, the view that there are irreducibly semantic
facts, to the dustbin to which they consigned such anti-

physicalist doctrines as dualism and vitalism.
held the day.

(Cf.

Field,

Physicalism

[1972].)

Tarski's dodge for avoiding paradox was to maintain

a

sharp distinction between object language and metalanguage
and to insist on different truth-predicates for different

languages.

A truth-predicate is

a

syntactic part of the

metalanguage in which it appears and is localized to the
specific object language for which truth is being defined.
It is not possible to define one over-arching truth

predicate on Tarski's scheme of things, although it is
possible to make some general claims about truth predicates.
Tarski thus employs two different approaches to discussing
truth.

The first is to give a specific truth definition

which is exemplar of his method.

The second approach

involves speaking more generally, laying down requirements

)
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that any adequate definition of truth
must meet:
it must be
consistent, the set of items said to be
true must be a
subset of the closed sentences (of the
object language), and
for every sentence s of the object
language, an instance of
schema T must be derivable as a theorem:
(T)

Here,

and

T

'p'

'T'

(

s

iff p

.

stands for s's translation in the metalanguage,

stands for the truth-predicate being defined.

We will follow Tarski in taking more than one
approach
to talking about truth.

First

I

will give a simple sample

truth definition illustrating how the relevant parts of
his

theory are supposed to work.

(This theory will contain an

unreduced notion of denotation, and we will then see how
this notion can be re-defined in terms of satisfaction.)
thus will have this as an example to point to.

adopt Tarski's more general way of talking.

will introduce the notion of

a

We

We also can

In addition,

'truth-theoretic pair' of

languages, which will give us a third way of talking.

An Example of

a

Truth Characterization

Except in one respect, Tarski's method of defining

truth is simple and intuitive.

The complication comes in

the notion of satisfaction sequences.

It would be nice to

be able to talk straightforwardly about formulas being

I

.
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satisfied by individuals, but that would
make satisfaction
into a relation with an indeterminate
number of

places: two,

for the satisfaction of *x is wise'
by Socrates; three, for
the satisfaction of ’x dances with y
by Mary and John, and
so forth.
Theoretically, it would be possible to do
'

semantics by defining many different
satisfaction relations,
one for each number of places a predicate
can have, but that
would make metatheory a mess. So Tarski
contrived

satisfaction as

a

two-place relation: sequences satisfy

formulas
The underlying motivation for the construction is

combinatorial.

One wants to cover all the possible ways of

lining up the elements of a domain with variables.

Let S be

the set of all (denumerable) sequences of items in whatever

domain you are interested in.

(So for example if there are

infinitely many different objects in the domain, some of the
sequences will have every member different, some will have
every member the same, and some will have

a

mixture.

)

For

each positive integer n, we can consider the nth place

across all the sequences, e.g. the fifth place.

Since the

set of denumerable sequences represents all the different

possible ways of arranging the objects in the domain into

a

denumerable sequence, every object is going to appear in the
fifth place of some sequence or other, ditto for the seventh
place, etc.

And for every two objects, there is going to be

some sequence in which the first of the two is in the fifth

.

.
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place and the second is in the seventh.

Similarly for every

triple, etc.
In the theory below, variables
are subscripted with

numbers.

The theory is set up in such a way that
the
numbers choose the place in the sequences
the variable is
going to 'look at'. For example (as it might
be) the
variables in 'x5 dances with x7 are evaluated
with respect
to the fifth and seventh places of the
sequences. The
'

formula will be satisified by any sequence
in which the item
in the fifth place dances with the item in
the seventh

place.

We have not quite got the whole story, but

I

hope

I

have given enough of it that the reader can see that Tarski
k e able to define satisfaction as a two-place relation

between

a

sequence and

As object-language
^•^l^-ulus

formula

a

will use a bit of the predicate

I

(it is not what Tarski used)

calculus defined by the two names

place predicates,

‘F’and

the two truth functors

1

‘G

—

1

>’

,

1

a

Let L be the sub—

.

and

1

1

b

1

,

the two one—

the two— place predicate
and

variables 'x',

‘I

1

,

'xl',

'x2',...and the universal quantifier symbol 'V'.

Terminology: variables and names are terms; formulas can be
open or closed; closed formulas are sentences

Truth (for L) will be defined in

E,

language containing among other things

.

an English-y

'

'

'
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(1) The

'F\

'

G

following translations of, respectively,
1

'a',

'b\

and 'I':

'Anchorage
'

Boston

'is a city'
'is a state'

'is

identical to'

Syntactic Vocabulary: designators for the expressions
of
L (instead of the quotational designators
which are normal
(2)

in English),

constructed from the following basic

expressions
Designators for the basic names and predicates and for

(a)

the first variable of L:
'

ecks

'be',

'ef',

'ge',

'id',

.

One-place function signs: 'the negation of', 'the

(b)

successor of'.

negation of
”

'ay',

means, intuitively, the result of concatenating

with...

1

(Negation is a syntactic operation, and 'the

The successor of' is used for constructing

.

designations of variables other than the first one, 'x'.
E.g.,

Two-place function signs: 'the conditionalization

(c)

of

.

'the successor of ecks' designates 'xl'.)

.

.

with

1

.

.

.

,

'the universal quantification of .. .with

respect to (variable)...',

'the result of applying (the

predicate )... to (the term)...'.
(d)

A three-place function sign:

'the result of applying

(the predicate )... to (the terms )... and ..

.

.

)

'
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(Examples: Although in English the
designator of 'Fa' is
(usually) " Fa'", in E the
structural-descriptive designator
of Fa' is the result of applying ef
to ay'. That of
VxFx is 'the universal quantification
of the result of
applying ef to ecks, with respect to ecks
'

(3)

.

Terminology of set theory and logic, including
the

identity sign and variables for functions.

(4)

Semantic Vocabulary:

satisifes',

'is a sentence',

'denotes',

'true', and 'the association of ...with (the

term )...'.

The language in which

I

am presently announcing all this is

neither L nor E, but English, our meta-metalanguage.
that the statement that 'Anchorage' translates
in the meta-metalanguage.

I

'a'

Note

is made

will not give the syntax of

or specify its workings any further; rather

E

will rely on

I

its similarity to English and the reader's understanding of

English, hoping that in the interest of readability, the

reader is willing thus to collude with me in

a

lack of rigor

of which Tarski would no doubt have disapproved.
In some of his expositions, Tarski seemed to envision

the actual individuals as his domain of interpretation.

will assume the actual individuals as domain.
exposition owes

a

McDowell [1980].)

(My

great deal to those of Burge [1972] and

We

)
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-tage

—

def inition of truth in terms of denotation
and

:

satisfaction

Step A: denotation
ay denotes Anchorage

be denotes Boston

Step B: association

Sequence

S

associates object o with term

t:

if t = ay, then o = Anchorage;

(i)

if t = be, then o = Boston.
(ii)

if t = ecks,

then o = the first object in S;

if t = the successor of a variable v, then if S

associates the nth object in

S

associates the n+l-th object in

with
S

v,

S

with t.

Step C; satisfaction
Laws of Satisfaction:
(For the sake of readability,

universal quantifiers.

I

will leave out the outermost

These laws thus look schematic, but

are intended to be understood with every variable

quantified
(a)

S

.

satisfies the result of applying ef to (term)

what £ associates with t is

a city.

t

iff
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satisfies the result of applying ge to t
iff what
associates with t is a state.
(b)

(c)

S

S

satisfies the result of applying id to

S

associates

satisfies the negation of (formula) F iff

s does not

'

(d)

S

and t' iff

t

what S associates with t is identical to
what
with t

S

.

satisfy F
(e)

S

satisfies the conditionalization of F with G iff
if

satisfies F, then
(f)

S

S

s

satisfies G.

satisfies the universal quantification of F with

respect to (variable) v iff every sequence just like

S,

except perhaps in what it associates with v, satisfies F.

Step D: truth
A thing is true iff it is a sentence and every sequence

satisfies it.

Comments:

(1)

Our sample truth-characterization is not given

for the same object language as Tarski’s was, and it differs
in other ways too.

In Tarski's object language there are no

individual constants (names), for example, although he

mentions them in other places.

(2)

We have only assumed and

not made explicit much of the apparatus needed for deriving

instances of Convention T in the metalanguage.

(3)

Denotation is not defined as such for predicates, although
it could be:

i.e., a truth characterization of a somewhat

different form could be given in which both names and

:

.
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predicates are said to denote.

Commentators on Tarskian

truth often have a truth characterization
of such a form in
mind when they put forward their arguments.
(4) In this
theory, as in Tarski's, some apparently
arbitrary

gerrymandering is done to achieve
definition of truth.

a

simple and uniform

For example, intuitively the

evaluation of variables and the evaluation of names
may seem
to be different kettles of fish, but they are
subsumed under

one definition.

The end results are what is desired:
are tautologies,

would say it in
etc.

)

'Ga'

'Fa'

is not true, and so on.

is true,
(Or,

so

as we

the result of applying ef to ay is true,

E,

Now, how is the reduction of denotation to

satisfaction done

Stage Two

?

reduction of denotation to satisfaction

:

(name) n denotes (object) o: Every sequence of which o is

first member satisfies the result of applying id to ecks and
n,

and, n = ay or every sequence of which o is first member

satisifes the result of applying id to ecks and n, and, n =
be

(A

colloquial rendering of this reduction such as one finds

in the literature on Tarski, a rendering using quotation

marks and
this

a

terminology where objects satisfy formulas, is
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o satisifes
'

x = n

'

’x = n'

and n =

'b

'

and n =
.

'a

1

or o satisfies

)

This completes our presentation of
the theory.

^ ar ^-*- er we said that Tarski had two
approaches to

talking about truth.

The first was to give an exemplar

definition similar to the one we have just seen.

The second

was to lay down a criterion that any truth
definition must
meet, as described above.

We will use a third approach to

talking about truth as well.

interpretation <M,i> and

a

Let's say that

syntax 0 comprises

theoretic pair <<M,i>,0> iff

i

for 0.

to be broadly enough construed so that

interpretations

count.

a

truth

truth-predicate can be

a

adequately defined in M given

syntax-under-

a

'Interpretation' is
'natural

Our languages E and L above form

truth theoretic pair (E as projected).

a

E received its

interpretation by overlapping English and by our agreeing to
understand it in

a

certain way.

A truth predicate is always

tied to two specific languages: the one it is defined in,
and the one it is defined for.

A truth definition is really

an elaboration of a complex relationship between two

languages, and the languages deserve as much emphasis as the

predicate itself, hence the focus of this terminology.

We

can also say we have a truth theoretic triple <<M,i>,0,T>

when <M,i> and 0 form

a

truth theoretic pair and T is a

truth characterization for 0 in M.
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Questions naturally arise about the relation
between
natural languages and the artificial
ones Tarski was looking
at.
In his earlier writings, Tarski
thought it was hopeless
to try to define truth for natural
languages; in his later
writings, he suggests that one can (at best)
approximate a
truth characterization for parts of natural
language.
By
this he appears to have meant that one can
give a truth

characterization for a formal artificial language that
resembles the part of (a) natural language one is
interested
in.

Since the time of Montague, we have become accustomed

to the idea that natural languages count as formal

languages.

The standard problem for giving a truth

characterization for

a

natural language is that natural

languages seem to formulate their own semantics, which leads
to paradox.

But we could consider a language such as

English to be one natural language while also taking it to
be (comprised of) more than one formal language.

We will

pick up again the question of the relationship between the

artificial languages for which Tarski thought truth

characterizations could be given and natural languages.

The Criticisms of Field, Putnam and Davidson

Almost as startling as the claim that truth can be
defined without any semantic primitives is the claim that

although Tarski's reduction is formally unexceptionable, it

:
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is nevertheless inadequate.

As noted above, Field thinks

the physicalist should not be satisfied
with Tarski's

reduction.

He argues by analogy, bringing forward
the

example of valence.

If you know the valence of a chemical

element (represented by an integer), you
can predict into
which chemical combinations that element
will enter. Early
physicalists hoped and later physicalists showed that

chemistry could be reduced to physics.
defined in terms of properties of atoms.

Valence can be
But what would not

count as a proper reduction is an enumeration such
as the

following
For any element e and valence n, e has n iff
e =

potassium and n = +1 or,

n = -2

(Cf.

,

or e = ...

[1972] p.

363.)

e

is sulphur and

.

Field holds that an enumerational

definition of denotation makes Tarski's reduction as empty
as this one.

He proposes that denotation be defined using

something like the causal picture in addition to Tarski's
theory.

Those who think that Tarski legitimated truth for

physicalists have been, it would seem, misled.
Putnam (among others) sees
definition.

a

second defect in Tarski's

He considers an instance of Convention T:

'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.

Since this is supposed to be

a

theorem in the metalanguage

in which it is stated on the Tarskian view, no assumption

:

:
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beyond those embodied in logic and set
theory is needed to
prove it. Thus it must be, like the
truths of logic, a
necessary truth. But it is contingent what
language we
speak, and this statement might
thus have been
false.

Similarly, the following might have been
true, although it
isn t
'

'Snow is white’ is true iff snow is green.

Clearly it is not a necessary falsehood.

Putnam allies

himself with Field in thinking that what is lacking
is an
intension for 'true'.

(See Putnam,

[1979] and [1985].)

The third objection to Tarski is ultimately derived
from Davidson.

(Cf.

[1984], p.56.)

criterion of adequacy is met by

a

It says that Tarski's

truth characterization

that consists just in a list of biconditionals that are

instances of Convention T and has no further articulation,
in particular, no account of denotation.

following (taken as axioms) would count as

For example, the
a

truth

characterization
'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white

'Boston is a city' is true iff Boston is a city.

And so would the following:

'

P'

'Q'

is true iff snow is white
is true iff grass is green
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Thus truth would seem to have little
to do with meaning; the
internal articulation of the sentences
doesn't contribute to
the definition of truth. This is very
unintuitive.
-These
objections all attempt to show that whatever
concept it is
that Tarski has shown how to define,
it is pretty far from
our ordinary conception of truth.

Defense of Tarski Against Putnam and Davidson

Putnam's difficulty was that the statement
'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
is in fact contingent, while on Tarski's view it would
be

necessary.

The criticism applies to sentences involving the

other semantic concepts as well, e.g.
'Snow' denotes snow.

This objection raises some interesting issues, but

think it refutes Tarski per se

.

I

do not

As we will see, the

objection relies on a feature English has, but not all
languages have, the indicative mood.

The artificial

languages Tarski studied do not have this feature.

Tarski

did not think a truth-characterization could be given for

English directly, and his famous sentence
Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
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appears only in informal exposition.

m

Tarski
'Ws'

e

s

It must be regarded,

writing, as a stand-in for some sentence
such as

Tr

<==>

Ws.

Nevertheless, it is an interesting question
whether Tarskian
truth-characterizations can be given for languages having

pragmatic features such as mood or tense and whether
they
can be given in such languages.

Although the English

instance of Schema T is something of

a

special case, having

as it does both mood and tense in both metalanguage
and

object language, it does need to be addressed by proponents
of Tarski

s

approach to truth.

Even though it is a special

case, Tarski is not off the hook.

If English really is so

clearly structured that we can understand it formally, and
if there should happen to be a way to understand English
'true'

consistently, but no way to make English 'true'

Tarskian, then Tarski would not have cast his net widely

enough and his conception of truth would be flawed.
Let us see how Putnam's objection depends on the

indicative mood.
mood.

There is

Linguists distinguish different kinds of
a

grammatical feature of verbs sometimes

called 'mood'; loosely coordinated with it is
linguists call 'notional mood'.

a

thing some

Roberts (in [1988])

distinguishes factual and non-factual notional mood.
Factual mood is the conventional means by which it is

indicated that

a

sentence is to be evaluated relative to the

speaker's world; in our case, the actual world.

Non-factual
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mood indicates that there is some question
about the truth
of the sentence at the speaker's world,
Roberts says.
If a

m

sentence is

the grammatical indicative and if the
context

is right, then the sentence is
interpreted as factual.

Non-

factual mood can be expressed in a number
of ways: by the
subjunctive grammatical mood, by such expressions
as

'suppose that'

probably

,

’

if

.

.

.

then

.
.

.

'

and 'supposedly'.

,

(I

'would',

'could',

guess it would be the

internal sentence that is in the non-factual mood,
but

Roberts does not say.)

This is as far as Roberts goes, but

we also need to note that in
at the party

1

,

a

sentence such as 'He must be

the internal clause 'he be at the party' is

supposed to be evaluated not only with respect to the actual
world, but with respect to a selected set of others as well.

Thus there are various means of indicating at what world or

worlds a sentence or clause is to be evaluated.

We refine

Roberts' view slightly by saying that a sentence in the

grammatical indicative and without modal expressions in it
is typically evaluated with respect to the speaker's world

and only with respect to the speaker's world.

Roughly, what happens when a sentence such as 'John is
tali' or 'Snow is white' is uttered in the factual mood is
this.

Just as the present tense (in the right

circumstances) forces evaluation with respect to the time of
utterance, the grammatical indicative (in the right

circumstances) forces evaluation at the world of utterance.
(For our utterances, this will be the actual world.)
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Moreover

only the actual world is relevant
to evaluation:
the sentence will be counted as
true if it is true in our
world, no matter how many other worlds
it is false
,

at.

Now let us return to Putnam's
objection. For the
purposes of this discussion ’contingent
will mean
’contingently true or contingently false'
and truth and
falsity will be metalinguistic truth and
1

falsity.

Tarski would have agreed to anything else.)

(I

doubt

It takes three

languages to state the objection: the bottom-level
object
language, home of 'snow' and of 'snow is white';
its

immediate metalanguage, home of '"snow is white" is true',
of the instance of T, and of

finally

a

'"snow" denotes snow'; and

higher metalanguage in which the claim of

contingence is made.

Now, the idea

I

want to push is that

any semantic sentences we intuitively judge to be contingent

will be in the grammatical indicative and will have no modal

expressions in them.
intuition.

(S)

Only such sentences generate the

Let's consider the sentence

"Snow" denotes snow.

We take (S) to be contingent, but there are closely related

sentences do not generate this intuition, though their
content is very similar.
do

.

Neither (S') nor

(S'

1

)

below would

:

(S')
(S' ')

D(

"

s
"

)

= s

"Snow" denotes snow in the actual world.
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The first of these sentences is in

have the indicative.

a

language that does not

The second has a modal expression in

The point is that it takes a certain
type of natural
language sentence to generate the
intuition of contingence,
and I think that if the reader will
test out his or her
intuitions on (S') and (S' ), he or she will
agree that they
to generate the intuition.
it.

1

believe that with respect to Putnam's objection,
the
dialectical situation is something like that in the
I

following scenario.

Suppose someone proposes to define the

predicate 'brother' as follows:

BROTHER

(

x

)

<==> MALE SIBLING(x).

And suppose someone reads off the definition like this:

something is a brother just in case it is

a

male sibling.

Suppose further that someone else hears this and makes the
objection: the proposed definition is inadequate because it

only tells us what it is to be a brother, not what it is to

have been or to be about to be

a

brother.

Obviously, several things would need to be

disentangled.

First, since the original definition is

stated in a language having no tenses, if the English is

meant as

a

pronunciation of the definition, the seeming

tense must be ignored, and the objection is not apropos.
the English is meant as a translation

,

a

to whether it is an adequate translation.

If

question arises as
Assuming that

English sentences can be taken tenselessly, the tenseless

s
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version of the English sentence would count
as a good
(enough) translation, and the objection
can easily
be

answered by pointing out that tenselessness
is intended.
If
on the other hand English sentences
can't be taken
tenselessly (and still be English, that is),
then the
translation is inadequate, and the objection
perhaps exposes
the inadequacy, but without really touching
the claim
of

equivalence between brother and male sibling

If one simply

.

abandons the formal sentence and takes the objection
to be
an objection to this claim

something is

a

brother just in case it is

a

male sibling,
(i.e., to the claim made by the full-blooded English

sentence), then one reply to the objection is to ask the

objecter to take the sentence tenselessly.

If the objecter

refuses to do this, perhaps on the ground that English just
is tensed and we can no more pretend we are not speaking a

tensed language than we can pretend we are not speaking in
prose, then one replies to the objecter by saying that the

concept brother has been analyzed correctly, although the
analysis has not been stated correctly by the objecter'
lights, and perhaps trying to state it in a way he would

find acceptable.

Except that we have

involving

a

a

more complicated type of case

layer-cake of three languages, the dialectical

situation in which we find Putnam's objection is very
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similar to that in the scenario.

As for tense in the

scenario, so for the indicative here.

After Tarski has made

his proposal, illustrating it intuitively
with

a

sentence

pronounced
Snow is white' is true iff snow is
white

Putnam comes along and objects that the
biconditional need
not have been true.
His point is approximately as relevant
as that of the objector in our scenario.
Once
again,

several things need to be disentangled.

If the English-y

instance of Convention T is intended to go proxy for
or be
translation of some formal sentence, we should ignore
the

indicative and understand the sentence in a 'moodless
if possible.

'

a

way,

If we just abandon formal language and study

the English sentence, an entirely new question arises:

whether there can be truth-theoretic pairs that yield the
following sentences with the meaning they have in English,
tense, inflection and all:

"

'Snow is white' is true iff snow

is white" and "'Snow' denotes snow".

Oddly, at one point, Tarski gives the following

examples of Convention T side by side, but without

commenting on them:
'It is snowing'

is true iff it is snowing

'The world war will begin in the year 1963'
is true iff the world war will begin in

the year 1963.
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(See [1956], p.404.)

The passage has the air of suggesting

something about tense, but it is not
clear what that
something would be. One moral that could
be drawn from the
appearance of the future tense in both
object language and
metalanguage is this: that every feature of
a sentence that
affects meaning needs some kind of translation
or other
rendering into the metalanguage. One way of
rendering tense
is by tense, although that may not be
the only way, and

similarly for mood.
There has not been much study of the interaction

between these three things: pragmatic features of
metalanguage, pragmatic features of object language, and
truth predicates.

Of the three, the truth predicate seems

to be relatively inert, the problems we are discussing being

generated by the interaction between pragmatic features of

metalanguage and object language.

In natural language, when

we use unadorned 'true' in indicative sentences, we

generally are talking about truth in the actual world,
unless something in the previous discourse or elsewhere in
the context has switched the world of evaluation.

But the

localization to the actual world appears to be carried, not
by 'true', but by the indicative plus the relevant features
of context.

If the content of 'true' were the same as that

of 'true at the actual world', or if it had some kind of

indexicality that demanded localization to the actual world,
there would be anomalies in such phrases as 'if such-andsuch were true' and 'not actually true'.

Moreover,

'true at
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every world

would mean something like 'true in
the actual
world at every world
which is not right. -So,
1

1

it is the

,

indicative that needs to be studied, rather
than truth £er
True also seems to be inert with
respect

—

^

*

to tense.)

More investigation is needed, but

I

suspect it will

turn out that Putnam's objection is something
of a red
herring.
Just as the person who paired brother with
male

sibling captured the concept correctly (although
there is
some question how to state the analysis in
different types
of languages) Tarski has captured the notion of
truth

correctly, and instances of Schema

(T)

are necessary, even

though it is not completely clear how to state

a

truth

characterization in and for languages with such features as
mood and tense.

And in being neutral, not itself indexical,

English 'true' resembles

a

formal Tarskian truth predicate,

and for most purposes it is a good-enough translation of

such a formal predicate.

We will discuss these issues

a

a

little more in the next chapter.
Finally, we turn to Davidsons

*s

objection: for a

language consisting of two unarticulated sentences,
'Q

1

,

'

the following list of axioms counts as an adequate

truth characterization:

'

P
'

P'

is true iff snow is white

Q'

is true iff grass is green

and
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And, as we noted above, truth
characterizations can be given
that simply ignore the inner articulation
of some sentences.

The short answer to this objection
is that it is a
virtue, not a defect, of Tarski’s
method that truth can be
defined for a large range of languages.
If truth conditions
could not be given for languages containing
sentences

without internal articulation, then truth could
not be
defined for the sentential calculus, and we would
have no

way of saying that the sentence

'P v -P

was true.

'

In fact,

these seemingly degenerate cases emphasize the

characteristics of Tarski's approach in

a

way the more

ordinary cases do not, and we will return to them in the
fisxt

chapter as part of developing

a

better picture of

Tarski's 'structural' conception of truth.

Three Attempts to Defend Tarski Against Field

For Field, Tarski's definition is inadequate because of
the trivial list— like quality of its rendering of

denotation: there is more to denotation than that

1

One

person who has attempted a reply is Etchemendy [Etchemendy,
1980], who accuses Field and other critics of Tarski of

failing to recognize that Tarski's characterization is

intended as stipulative rather than analytic.

He uses an

analogy to explain the difference:
If I define a set, call it EVEN, as the set containing all sums of two odd primes, it would be a

,
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confusion to object that my definition
presupposed
C
eCtneSS ° f] Goldbach s conjecture.
°^
.^[W]here
roV^
Goldbach s conjecture comes in is with
the claim that
r
nUI e
than 2 is a »eniber Of EVEN
of\
^ Sdefined. To
]
be sure, the name I chose
for- bbe Set
f may be
misleading, but the definition it^
self
does not thereby become a substantive
claim.
'

LT?
^

([1980] p. 58)

The point seems to be that in giving a
Tarskian truth
definition, one is making a stipulation that
defines

certain set.

a

(We might for example call a certain set

containing 'Fb\

'Fb— >Fb\ etc, which

is defined as a

result of our exemplar definition above, TRUE.)

To get

a

substantive claim from this, according to Etchemendy,
one
must introduce a primitive notion of truth —'truth*'— and

claim that all and only the true* sentences (of the language
in question) are members of that set.
9.

(Cf.

[1980], pp. 58-

)

Of Field, Etchemendy says that he 'misdiagnoses' the

difference between two styles of definition.

Accusing Field

of misunderstanding Tarski's aim (or seeming to - it is
unclear), he says that in Field's view, Tarski's aim was the

reduction of the semantic concept of truth to concepts

acceptable to a physicalist, and that this is

a

mistake.

He

then speculates about how such a mistake came to be made:

Where Field was misled, it seems, is in thinking that
the source of the perceived difference between recursive
and list-like definitions has to do with a reduction
of the semantic facts to facts in virtue of which those
semantic facts hold. But the perceived difference has
nothing to do with such a reduction and indeed arises
only in claims involving the unreduced notion of truth.
([1980], p. 59, fn. 7)
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This criticism of Field seems to embody
a number of
confusions.
First, Field is worried about Tarski’s
method
of defining basic denotation, not the
recursive clauses in
Tarskian truth-characterizations.
Etchemendy says nothing
about how the issue of list-likeness
versus recursiveness
bears on denotation. Actually, the original
specification
of the denotation function in our example
above and its re-

definition in terms of satisfaction are equally
list-like.
Second, although Tarski did have some aims not

emphasized by Field, this would not be inconsistent
with his

having had other aims as well.

In ours and in Tarski's

exemplar definitions of truth, the truth predicates are
indeed, from a formal point of view, defined predicates, and

Tarski's reduction of all the semantic notions to

satisfaction is, yes, part of his attempt to eliminate them
for the purpose of showing consistency.

But Tarski did not

randomly choose 'Tr' as his truth predicate!

He clearly

thought his work had a bearing on certain issues of interest
to philosophers.

(See his remarks in [Tarski, 1944].)

Third, Etchemendy

'

s

claims about the occurrence of

stipulation are open to question.

Let's take Tarski's two

approaches to talking about truth separately and try to
apply Etchemendy' s remarks to them in turn, starting with

exemplar truth definitions.

Etchemendy (apparently) is

claiming that a definition of truth such as the one above is
stipulative.

(Again, he does not say how this bears on

denotation or whether the definition of denotation is

.
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supposed to be stimulative too.)

But both in the case of

our definition and in the case of
Tarski

's,

the definitions

are e xemplar and as such are well-embedded
in their contexts
and thus not asserted. When you
get right down to it, I did
not stipulate meanings for 'true (relative
to L) and
•denotes (relative to L)
if i hadf i wou ld be able tQ
'

report truly here that
are speaking, which

I

with any stipulations.

'b'

denotes Boston in the language we

cannot.

The apparent stipulation has no

force in the larger context.
sense) does not entail

did not extend our language

I

'Defined'

'stipulated'.

(in the relevant

Definition is

independent of context, but not stipulation: it is relative
to context in the sense that the same sentences may be in

one context of investigation stipulative of meaning and in

another not.

In discussions of Tarski, exemplar truth

definitions generally involve artificial languages and may
give the appearance of stipulating meanings for those
languages.

But unless they also appear asserted on their

own, meaning does not actually get stipulated.

Well, what does happen when a truth definition or

characterization is asserted

?

Whether the characterization

is stipulative or analytic largely depends on the intentions

of the person who puts it forward.

Someone who offers, say,

truth conditions for sentences of English containing mass
terms might well intend this as

a

contribution toward

analyzing some intuitive conception of truth.

The mere fact

.
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of having written down truth
conditions in Tarskian form
would not defeat this intention.

Now let's turn to the second way
of talking about
truth.
Do Etchemendy's remarks apply ?
Well, one cannot
say that Tarski was stipulatively
defining metalinguistic
truth
general, since there is no one overarching
truth
predicate. He did stipulate the conditions
under which it

m

is possible to construct in a
metalanguage "methodologically

correct and materially adequate" definitions
of semantic
concepts.
Here his remarks were stipulative, but with
an

obvious intended application.

Also, they were normative:

Tarski's idea was that if one wants to talk coherently
about
truth, one had better have a metalanguage and an
object

language and make sure they form

a

truth-theoretic pair.

-I

conclude that Etchemendy's defense of Tarski does not
succeed

Another who has made the attempt is Soames
interprets Field

s

criticism.

.

He too

He holds Field to be saying

that a genuine reduction must show semantic facts to be

supervenient on physical facts.
'b'

But Tarski's 'reduction' of

denotes Boston

eventually boils down to this, says Soames:
'b'

=

'b'

and Boston = Boston,

(or as we'd say in E,

"be = be and Boston = Boston"), which

seems not to get us any farther toward discovering the facts
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on which the reference of 'b' supervenes.

Relatedly,

according to Soames, the former seems to
be contingent and
the latter necessary.
He connects this second objection
with one we have already mentioned, Putnam's.
Inspired by Lewis [1975], Soames proposes one
reply for
both objections: we should conceive of language
in such
a

way as to reject both the demand that semantic
properties be
dependent on speakers and the demand that truth
conditions
be contingent.

(Similar demands are appropriate for

related theory of language use, he thinks.)
think of a (standard first-order) language as

consisting in (i)

a

a

He wants us to
a

triple

family of sets representing the various

categories of well-formed expressions of the language,
a

(ii)

domain of objects, and (iii) an "interpretation" function

assigning objects to names, sets to predicates, etc..

He

says

Let J be a class of such languages. Truth can now
be defined in nonsemantic terms for variable 'L'
in J in a straightforward Tarskian fashion.
The only
significant change from before is that the notions of
primitive denotation are no longer given languagespecific list definitions, but rather are defined for
variable 'L' using the "interpretation" functions built
into the languages.
In particular, a name n refers
to an object o in a language L iff [the interpretation,
for that language, of] n = o.
([1984], p. 425.)
The proposal here is that we think and speak about language
sub specie aeternitatis
view:

,

or from a 'God's eye' point of

from the outside, if you will, rather than from the

inside.

Soames puts it very nicely:

...languages are abstract objects, which can
be thought of as bearing their semantic
properties essentially. There is no possibility
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that expressions of a language might
have
denoted something other than what they
denote or that sentences of a language do
might
have had different truth conditions.
Any
variation in semantic properties (across
worlds)
is a variation in languages.
([ 1984 ], p. 425
I think this is a step
in the right direction, but that it
is not enough to answer either
Field's or Putnam's objection
fully, and that it has special problems
of its own.
It
;

)

also

is not very Tarskian in certain respects.

Let's examine the

issues more closely.
Each of the two objections has more to it than
Soames
supposes.

Putnam makes his objection by pointing out an

intuition that the following are contingent!
'Snow' denotes snow

'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.

Early in his article, Soames comments that Tarski thought

truth could only be defined for artifical languages, and in
so saying, he seems to brush English aside.

Then, after

presenting Putnam's objection, he says this in reply: let's
not think of the sentences as contingent.

Now, which

sentences are we to refrain from thinking of as contingent?

Formal ones, such as 'T("s") <==>

s'

generate no clear

intuition of contingence, as discussed above.

sentences do.

But about these, the suggestion

The English
'let's not

think of them as contingent' provokes the following
response: Well, okay, if you insist, -but are they

contingent as we ordinarily understand them?.

The formal-

mode analogue of the move Soames has made is to say 'let's

.
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abandon ways of talking in which we take
inflection
seriously and instead just use
Mathematicalese when talking
about language and truth'. Again, okay,
but
it's not as if

inflected speech will thereby cease to
exist.

The challenge

Putnam's observation presents to the defender
of Tarski is
not to show that we can talk coherently
about truth and

denotation (Tarski himself showed we can); the
challenge is
to show that the way we do talk about truth
and denotation
in English is, when coherent, Tarskian.

Soames does not

help us with this.
Soames might wish to say that the English sentences
are

non-contingent too and to remind us that his observations
about language use are intended to explain the apparent

contingence of English instances of T.

If the realm of

phenomena Soames had in mind when he said 'use' were
pragmatic phenomena such as mood and tense, and if he had
something to say about them,

I

might agree, but he has

speaker meaning and convention in mind.

No one has ever

questioned that 'Jones uses "snow" to mean snow' was
contingent.
snow

What we want to know about is '"Snow" denotes

'

Soames

's

observations also do not answer Field; they

leave the intuitive oomph of Field's objection untouched.

Even someone sitting on God's shoulder might want to know,
is this all there is to denotation,

a

list-like correlation

for each language, i.e. a list of lists?

After Soames has

had his say, we are still stuck with lists.
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Tarski clearly was thinking of language
from a God's
eye point of view (in a way not
much different from what
Soames proposes).
it is far from clear what the
relationship between tensed and inflected
ways of talking
and ways of talking typified by formal
languages is or ought
to be and whether and how they can be mixed.
At heart, the

problem -the

'

necessitation effect'- is the same problem as

the one that arises in construing the having of
properties
as set membership:
6

{

x

x
|

'Rover is spotted' is contingent;

is spotted

'Rover

has a claim to being necessary.

}
'

There are a host of metaphysical and linguistic
issues here,
(and they are not ones that the distinction between
language

and used language is going to be able to address).
I

mentioned that in addition to failing to answer Field

and Putnam completely, another problem is introduced by

Soames

s

proposal.

His wording is

a

little ambiguous, but

he seems to envision definitions only of truth predicates of
the following form:

'true in such-and-such language'.

Denotation seems to be
in L.

a

three-termed relation:

a

denotes

x

This would seem to rule out from the beginning the

idea of giving Tarskian truth-characterizations for natural

languages or parts of them.

English comes equipped just

with the one truth predicate, and when it is used, typically
we see exhibited, but not reported, what language the object

language is.

Of course, one can also add 'in French', or

whatever, when appropriate, but the point is that there are

.
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more truth-theoretic pairs out there
than Soanes makes room
for

The third attempt to answer Field's
objection comes
from Putnam [1979].
(The selfsame Putnam who finds himself
compelled to criticize Tarski on other grounds.)
His
defense occurs in a more specialized context
than
ours.

He

is thinking about the truth of the
statements of science,

and he institutes the assumption that all of
empirical

science has been formalized in some language and
that truth
has been defined for that language in Tarskian style.

He is

considering the questions whether such a Tarskian truth

characterization adequately captures the correspondence view
of truth (of science) and to what extent Tarski's theory is

realist.

He argues that it is to a certain extent a realist

theory and then brings forward Field's objection, asking

whether it should stir uneasiness in the heart of someone
who holds the position he has just argued for.
should not, giving two related defenses.

He thinks it

One defense goes

as follows:

'"Electron" refers to electrons' - how else
should we say what 'electron' refers to from
within a conceptual system in which 'electron'
is a primitive term?
([1972], p.32)

Field has a fairly easy reply here.

Putnam begs the

question by trading on the intuitive English meaning of
'refers'

in his example sentence, i.e. in the sentence.

'Electron' refers to electrons.
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A term that in intuitive English
better captures the
conception of denotation to which Field
is objecting is 'is
functionally correlated with'. If we put
it into the
example sentence, we get:

Electron' is functionally correlated
with electrons.
Now,

how

e lse

should we say" what electron refers to from

within a conceptual system in which 'electron'
is
primitive term?

a

Field's reply is obvious: we should use

a

term that expresses a meatier conception of
denotation,
'refers', for example.

That is his point.

Putnam's other line of defense is to say that although
the specification of the denotation function is list-like,
the list has a special structure which is illuminating:
'Electron' refers to electrons
'Dog'

refers to dogs

A list of just this structure is needed to define truth,
Putnam holds.

Unfortunately he does not say what the

structure in question is, exactly, but he compares the list
of denoters and denotees to instances of schema T, and he

speaks of

'triviality'.

(See [1972], pp. 31-32.)

:

57

It is not competely clear what is
going on in this

passage, but Putnam seems to be conflating
two different
kinds of triviality. The sentences

Electron

refers to electrons

and

'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white

are apparently a priori and in this way trivial.

However to

say of something that it is listlike is not to
attribute

this kind of triviality to it.

Moreover even this kind of

triviality depends on the truth theory in question being
homophonic, which is not

a

necessary feature of Tarskian

characterizations: if instead of using quotation marks
we gave words names, e.g.,

'Mutt',

'Jeff', etc., the

specification of the denotation function would not have

a

particularly illuminating structure, even if we did use
'

refers

'

Mutt refers to electrons

Jeff refers to dogs

Field of course recognizes that

a

list of a certain

structure is needed, but he thinks more is needed as well.

?
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CHAPTER III

THE STRUCTURAL CONCEPTION OF TRUTH

Tarski Defended Against Field

Simply put, our problem is, does Tarski's theory

present as defective a reduction as Field's psuedo-reduction
of valence?

Is

n denotes x iff
n =

'b'

and

satisfies

x

satisfies

x

'x =

'x =

Boston' or n = 'c' and

Chicago' or....

as defective a reduction as
e

has n iff
e =

potassium and

n = -2 or e =

.

.

.

n = +1 or e = sulphur and
.

In my opinion, the answer is no.

By and large, by the

standards of the positivists, a concept was shown to be

respectable if it could be defined in terms of physical

properties or the notions of logic and set theory or both.
Making

a

notion such as truth respectable to the physicalist

does not require defining the notion in terms of physical

properties (such as those involved in the causal theory of

.
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reference) if logical ones will do.

Tarski said he would

show how to define truth (for a
given language) in purely
logical terms and that is what he
did.
It may be that his
theory is defective or incomplete,
but not for the reason
Field gives.
,

A better analogy would be one where
some concept is
successfully defined in purely logical terms.
This would

provide

a

model to study.

And if we could find a concept

defined in purely logical terms where an
enumeration was an
essential part of its meaning, that would be
even better.
Here one is tempted by the truth function 'and'.

'And'

actually shares some of the predicate 'true"s
more

mysterious features.
All that

P

'and'

seems to be otiose.

and Q' means is, it seems, meant by the two

sentence discourse

asserting

Like 'true',

P and Q'

'P.

Q.

'

All that can be accomplished by

can (apparently) be accomplished by

asserting the conjuncts separately.

There is no physically

observable relation of andness to which 'and' corresponds.

Moreover

,

and

'

does not seem to be able to be defined in

behavioristic or operational terms.

One might even be

tempted to conclude that 'and' has no cognitive content,
that it is used merely in a stylistic variant of a two-

sentence discourse.

Conceivably, someone might mount a

campaign to expunge 'and' from a scientifically correct
vocabulary.

Could we not rescue 'and' from this fate with the

following observations?

On the semantic side, we say that

T

1

60

•and

1

expresses

truth function, a function that
takes the
truth values of the component
sentences of a conjunctive
sentence to truth value. Thus the
semantics of
a

‘and

given using the notions of 'truth

and 'function

1

1

is

1

Bringing
these two notions forward, of course,
is not enough: we must
say w hich truth function we are
talking about.
It is the
one that takes the truth of both
conjuncts to true the
falsity of but one conjunct to false and
the falsity of
both conjuncts to false. -Note that this
is an enumeration.
.

,

,

Assuming for the moment that truth is

a

purely logical

notion, one might say that 'and' has been defined
in purely

logical terms.

-Is there anything amiss here from the

physical is tic point of view?

Is there any deficiency in

this account of the meaning of 'and' that is owed to
the

presence of an enumeration?
underlying property,
1
'

s

and

'F' 's

To seek further for some

'andness' that explains the patterns of

in the truth table seems perverse.

one wants to say, is all there is to 'and

1

.

This,

Even to those

who like intensional functions, it would be proper to

maintain that this pattern, this list, this correlation, is
essential to the meaning of 'and

Only a physicalist who

1

.

was also a complete nominalist and wanted to eschew such

abstract objects as correlations, could be dissatisfied.
(And then the burden of proof would shift.)

What

I

have just outlined is

a

view about the meaning

of 'and' that is un-Tarskian and oversimplified to the point

of incorrectness.

Nevertheless, we can give

a

defense
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against Field that is based on its main
ideas.
One problem
with the above conception of the meaning
of ’and' is that it
ignores mere formulas that have

a

conjunction symbol in

them.

But for our purposes we can continue
to ignore them
and just specify part of the meaning
of 'and'.
We can say
something like this:

An interpreted language L has a truth-functional

sentential conjunctor iff there is at least one
true sentence of L and at least one false

sentence of L and there is some

syntactic operation, C, of L such that
for any (closed) sentences, F and G, of L,
if F is true and G is true, the result

(i)

of applying C to F and G is true
(ii)

if F is true and G is false, the result

of applying C to F and G is false
(iii) if F is false and G is true, the result

of applying C to F and G is false, and
(iv)

if F is false and G is false, the result

of applying C to F and G is false

Tarski's theory makes truth (and denotation, which we
will get to in a minute) a structural notion, like 'and'.

Metalinguistic truth is parasitic on the tightly correlated
structures of two languages.

It is present partly in virtue

of two languages of appropriate structure existing.

explained above,

I

As

think we should take seriously Tarski's

,
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claim to have reduced truth to purely
logical notions. To
defend Tarski, we should try to use
this idea to reply to
Field.
Field's analogy is only moving in the
absence of an
alternative model, which we now have.
It remains to make
the extension to denotation.
To the person perched on God's shoulder
who wants to
know,

'is this all there is to

list of lists?'

denotation

- is it

just a

Tarski can say 'there is a such a concept

of denotation, and it is the one relevant to
defining

metalinguistic truth'.
In order to simplify the discussion,

let me return to

the original definition of denotation for L.

We noted that

it and its Tarskian reduction were equally enumerational

and since it is enumerationality that is at stake, it will
not matter for present purposes which we use.

Denotation

for L, then, is simply the (functional) pairing of

Anchorage and

'b*

'a'

with

with Boston.

Here is what Tarski can say to Field: it is the fact of

correlation that contributes to the presence of

metalinguistic truth and falsity, not how the correlation is
done, i.e., how it is physically realized.

(Martians, after

all, might do it differently than we do and yet use the same

symbols.

And even in our everyday life, different physical

processes can embody denotation.)

If enough structure is

present, however it is realized, there will be

metalinguistic truth and falsity.
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Just as we ask which truth function
‘and
represents in
English, we ask which denotation
function ’denotes' (from E
1

above) represents; the answer, given in
essential terms, is
a list: the one that assigns
Anchorage to ’a’ and Boston to
'b'.
Of course, where we happen to have a
language that is
used by humans, we can also pick out the
function in non-

essential terms: the one that associates with
'George Bush'
the object at the other end of a certain
actual causal
chain, etc.

What is needed for defining metalinguistic

truth is a determination of referents for names,
not any

particular physical realization of such

a

determination.

Metalinguistic truth supervenes on structure, not on any
P ar bi cu lar kind of physical events that happen to exhibit

that structure.

More needs to be said about the structural conception
of truth and what it involves.

More will be said shortly.

But first, let us measure Tarski's theory up against Field's

with respect to the problems discussed in the previous
chapter.

Field's theory is Tarski's with denotation

construed as actual causal chains.

Although Tarski has

replies to the various objections that have been aimed at
him, it might nevertheless be the case that Field's theory
is preferable: maybe Field can explain the apparent

contingence of certain instances of Schema T, or maybe he is

better at dealing with inflected languages, or maybe his
view has some advantage for the materialist over Tarski's.
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Does Fiel d's Emendation Improve Tarski?

Does Field improve on Tarski in any way?

example

,

For

does he give us any hint about how to
construct

a

truth-characterization that either makes instances
of T
contingent or gets truth theory and inflection
to walk hand
in hand when he insists on real denotation?
Or

does he gain

advantages for the physicalist by limiting
denotation to
certain actual historical processes?

Unfortuately

,

there are literally dozens of different

ways in which to construe Field's emendation of Tarski.

Let

me list some of the distinctions in virtue of which
there

are so many ways.

First, there is the distinction between

individual truth characterizations and the general criterion
of adequacy.

Field makes his initial proposal in connection

with an exemplar truth characterization for an artificial
language.

Now he obviously does not think that one should

follow his advice about denotation only for that one
language.

But it is unclear how general his proposal is

supposed to be.

As we will see below, emending the general

criterion is a questionable enterprise.
Even if we can decide where to emend Tarski, it is not

clear exactly how Field is proposing to do it.

words 'actual' or 'actually'

(and their brothers in other

languages) be used in the clause for denotation?

Sometimes?

Should the

Always?

('In the actual world' does appear in Field's

schema, but in parentheses.

One doesn't know whether it is
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intended as an aside or as something
else.)
Could the
effect that Field wants, whatever
it is, be achieved merely
by limiting the domain of any acceptable
truth

characterization to actual objects?

Must the object-

language names in a truth characterization
actually have
been attached to real individuals (by
dubbing)? Is Field
proposing that a conception of denotation be
used into the
analysis of which the concept of causal chain
enters? Or

would it be all right if truth characterizations
were
limited so that it just worked out that there is
never said
to be denotation except where there are in fact
causal

chains?

(What about the Martians?)

A third complication is introduced by the fact
that

Field himself gives two proposals, as we described in

Chapter One.

The second is supposed to be

a

straightforward

generalization of the first (from truth to truth at

a

world), but in virtue of some of the things we said in the

previous paragraph, there is more than one candidate for
'the'

generalization of the initial proposal.
A fourth complication is introduced by the fact that we

are asking whether Field has improved on Tarski with respect
to certain kinds of indexicality

.

We are entertaining the

idea that Tarskian truth characterizations can be given in

and/or for languages with pragmatic features.
a

This suggests

four-fold way of classifying truth-theoretic pairs:

(a)

ones where neither metalanguage nor object language has

pragmatic features (Tarski's original exemplar truth

;

)
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characterization was like this);

(b)

ones where the object

language has pragmatic features, but
the metalanguage does
not (such a relationship between
metalanguage and object
language would be similar to that found
in the standard
(model-theoretic theories of tense and indexicals);
)

(

c

)

ones where both metalanguage and object
language have

pragmatic features (our English instance of T
may be part of
such a pair); and (d) ones where the
object language does
not have pragmatic features while the metalanguage
does

(sometimes it is said that the meaning of
artificial

language is derived from that of natural language, that

a

natural language is "the ultimate metalanguage" for
an

artificial language).

For present purposes we will assume

all four combinations are possible.

(We will discuss some

questions about this assumption below.
The combinatorial possibilities are horrendous.

The

cheap way out is just to say that it is unclear what Field
intends and leave it at that.
the combinations, but

I

I

will not grind through all

will comment on a few of the more

salient ones.

A proposal to emend the general criterion of adequacy

with something like the following stipulation is too
extreme

Truth cannot be characterized for
(

denotational

)

a

language unless

the denoters and denotees listed in the

characterization are in fact connected by
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causal chains.
One effect of this stipulation
would be to rule out the idea
that truth can be defined for merely
imaginary languages,

even imaginary languages whose names
and predicates are
actually betokened.
(E.g., one can imagine 'stone
languages' whose expressions are configurations
of stones.)
Which would probably be all right with Field,
though not
with Tarski. But here is something one
would hope Field

would find objectionable.

Although we can probably get

temporary stipulation of meaning for artificial
languages to
fit under the causal umbrella somehow, truth

characterizations like ours above in which meaning does
not
actually get stipulated and which never emerge from indirect

discourse would not be allowed to count as truth

characterizations

.

-This seems too extreme.

From the standpoint of trying to get truth theory and

inflection to walk hand in hand, the use of 'actual
'actually'

is bound to cause trouble.

'

or

We hoped to be able

to characterize truth and denotation (for certain languages)
n ot from a God's eye point of view.

In a case like this

'Snow' actually denotes snow

the adverb ensures a necessary truth where we hoped for a

contingent one.
'b'

In a case like this

actually denotes Boston

the use of the adverb ensures a necessary falsehood.
It is far from clear that whatever advantages Field's

approach secures for the materialist point of view, these
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advantages cannot be achieved without
emending Tarski so
drastically.
For example, Tarski took the
expressions of a
language to be classes of tokens -which
were physical
objects- of certain sizes and shapes.
Perhaps if we simply
confined denoters and denotees to actual
objects, that would
be enough for Field.
Now

I

would like to say a little more about the

structural conceptions of truth and denotation.

The Structural Conceptions of Truth and Denotation

An answer has been given to Field's criticism, but what

exactly is involved in the structural conceptions of truth
and denotation?

In fact, there are two questions: what is

involved, and, how should we talk about it in English?

There is not space to undertake

a

detailed comparison of the

structural conception of truth with other conceptions, but
some questions are easily answered.

whether Tarski's theory is

a

We will consider

correspondence theory and also

whether according to it 'true' (or other truth predicate) is
redundant.

In the next section, we will discuss how to talk

about (structural) truth in languages like English.
Is Tarski's theory a correspondence theory of truth?

This question as it is phrased does not really get at the
issues, and it needs to be replaced by a cluster of

questions: In our exemplar truth characterization, is 'true'
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a

correspondence?

A correspondence with reality?

it the

ls

case that for any truth
characterization, truth will be a
correspondence? A correspondence with
reality? if there is
a way of giving in (part of)
the inflected language, English
a truth characterization for
another part of English and of
defining 'true', will the result define
'true' as

correspondence with reality?

For present purposes, let us

assume that reality and actuality are the
same thing.
Truth i£ always

a

correspondence on Tarski's view.

our exemplar characterization above, truth
is

correspondence with reality:
to Boston's being a city.

In

a

'Fb\ for example corresponds

In Tarski's intuitive examples in

his informal discussions, he never contemplates
unreal
objects.

However, there is nothing in Tarski's prescribed

method for defining truth that rules out
merely possible objects,

a

domain containing

(although the consistency

requirement would prevent certain kinds of things from
counting as truth characterizations).

So the answer to the

question whether truth is correspondence with reality in
every allowable truth characterization is no.
If a truth definition were given that captured the

English first level 'true', would it define truth as

correspondence with reality

?

a

This question is hard to

answer without first deciding how we would divvy up Natural

English into formal languages, and what we think about such
expressions of English as 'Santa Claus'.

However, the lack

of anomaly of 'true in some other world' and the other
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expressions we cited above seems to
suggest that the answer
would be no, as does the case
of truth characterizations in
indirect discourse.

(An interesting question:

could

adequacy conditions for defining
'actually true' be stated?)
Are truth predicates redundant? In
particular, is the
(first-level) English 'true', if it can
be defined
Tarskianly redundant? Let us take as
our example
Snow is white' is true.
,

Whether we want to say this is redundant
depends on what we
mean by 'redundant'.
I take this notion to have
an

epistemological component.

The idea is that if we hear and

believe these two sentences
Snow is white
'Snow is white'

is true,

we acquire no information from the second that we
had not

already acquired from the first.
A truth predicate is otiose in the sense mentioned

but not redundant.

If we assume a background logic

of high enough order, we can always define truth for

language, and such

a

a

definition will add no new physical

concepts or logical ones beyond what we have already
assumed.

But that does not mean that we cannot acquire new

information from the second of the two sentences above.
helps to think of 'true' as having

a

status more like that

of the logical connectives than like that of
such as

'green'.

It

a

predicate

"Snow is white and snow is white" differs

from "Snow is white" in that it exhibits, without reporting,
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the presence of conjunction.

Similarly,

'"Snow is white'' is

true' exhibits without reporting
the presence of a truth-

theoretic pair.

The information is pragmatically
rather

than semantically imparted, but it
is universally imparted:
every utterance of the sentence will
pragmatically impart,
or exhibit, this information.
(We might say that a sentence
r eports its truth conditions and
exhibits whatever must be
true of its context of utterance in order
for it to be
u ^-^ ere(3 truly,

minus its truth conditions.)

In Chapter Two, we remarked that the

'degenerate' cases

of truth definitions expose the character of
Tarski's

conception of truth more clearly than the standard cases.
One thing they illustrate is the following rather
surprising
fact: truth is independent of denotation in the sense that

there are some truth characterizations where truth is

defined without denotation being specified for the object
language.

Also we should note that

a

characterization where

the sentences said to be true were all logical truths would

count as a truth characterization.

Tarski's conception of

truth allows truth to be defined when sentence-by-sentence

translation between metalanguage and object language exists,
but not a more articulated translation relation.

This

allows truth characterizations to be given even for signals.

Given the following somewhat elliptical stipulation of

meaning for Signalese,

'one if by land, two if by sea',

and

the obvious translation of Signalese into English, it would

.
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be correct to say that the signal
given to Paul Revere was
true

Some may regard these cases as
bad ones for Tarski.
I
think they illustrate the breadth
and power of his theory.
(Tautologies of the sentential calculus
are true, and, the
British did come by sea.) But his
conception of truth does
have some rather unintuitive consequences.
Earlier, we

contemplated 'the language of the stones', and
such a thing
-ould count as a language containing true sentences by
Tarski s lights. At one point, Tarski worries
about the

fact that the class of all expressions of his
object

language is infinite.

He says

Normally expressions are regarded as the products
of human activity (or as classes of such products).
From this standpoint, the supposition that there
are infinitely many expressions appears to be
obviously nonsensical. But another possible
interpretation of the term 'expression' presents
itself: we could consider all physical bodies of
a particular form and size as expressions.
The
kernel of the problem is then transferred to the
domain of physics. The assertion of the infinity
of the number of expressions is then no longer
senseless and even forms a special consequence of
the hypotheses which are normally adopted in
physics or in geometry.
([1956], p.174 fn. 2)
Tarski puts no further constraints on what can count as

linguistic expressions.

Is Tarski committed to the idea

that stone walls, e.g., betoken true sentences?

His wording

is uncharacteristically ambiguous, but he may be.

But it is

very easy to limit Tarski's conception of truth to get rid
of any cases one finds displeasing.

For example, one can

rule out the language of the stones by limiting syntax to

humanly usable languages, or even to humanly usable

)
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languages all of whose basic
vocabulary is actually used.
One can also define a more
limited conception of truth that

would rule out certain 'degenerate'
cases by demanding at
least as much articulation in
an object language sentence as
in its metalanguage translation.
(One can if
one feels so

moved

.

I

hope this discussion has given the
reader

a

feel for

the Tarskian conception of truth and
for the differences
between it and Field's conception of it.

Talking About Truth and Denotation in English

Discussion of Tarskian truth can give rise to
phenomenon.

a

funny

While the set-theoretic facts with respect to

a

given truth characterization are perfectly clear, we

nevertheless can find ourselves saying some bizarre-sounding
things when describing those facts in ordinary English,
using 'true',

'language',

'denotes' and so on.

For example,

in considering certain languages —not English—, one might be

moved to say "'Snow is green' is true.

There are two sorts

of questions one might ask in the face of this phenomenon.
First, how can we talk colloquially about Tarskian truth and
not mislead?

Second, how do we talk about truth in English,

and is our talk Tarskian?

largely

a

The first question raises what is

practical problem.

more interesting.

The second question is much

As wide as Tarski cast his net, maybe it

.
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was not wide enough.

In this section,

I

do what

I

can

toward showing that he in fact did
cast his net widely
enough, although all I can do here is
look at a few
preliminary indicators.
Are there truth theoretic triples
where the
metalanguage and/or the object language have
pragmatic
features? Does Natural English contain
languages that form
the truth theoretic pairs that go into such
triples? Do any

of them yield our sentence,
’Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white,

with the meaning we take it to have in Natural
English,
tense, inflection and all?

Another interesting question is

whether, if there are such pairs, there are constraints
on

what kinds of pragmatic features can appear in each member
of such a pair.

(As we will see in a moment,

considerations seem to suggest that such
'hetero-pragmatic

'

a

some

pair must be

)

Another set of questions arises from contemplating the
things we are led to say in English when we use 'denotes'
and 'true' to describe parts of truth characterizations.

The Tarskian conception of truth seems to require us to make
a

lot of rather unintuitive claims if we want to use

English: e.g., that 'snow is green' is true, that 'snow'

denotes grass, and, worst of all, that 'snow is green' is

both true and false.

The structures are just there, after

all, and these sentences seem to describe them.

respect to this set of questions,

I

(With

will suggest that in
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English there are some pragmatic
constraints on assertions
of semantic facts.)
Our two main points of focus
will be whether it is
possible to have truth theoretic pairs
where features such
as tense and inflection are taken
seriously and what it
might be like to use such pairs - is it
like what we do when
we describe semantic facts in English?
I cannot answer all
the questions I have raised, but I will
suggest that nothing
yet rules out the idea that English contains
truth theoretic

pairs, and

I

will suggest that pragmatic constraints are

both necessary and formulable for semantic talk
in English.
The rest of this chapter will be somewhat speculative.

Nothing rules out the existence of English truth-

theoretic triples ab initio

Somewhere in

.

a footnote,

Kripke briefly mentions the possibility of having

a

metalanguage with pragmatic features, without saying
anything more about it.

Earlier, we speculated that Tarski

might have believed that tense would need to have a

translation or other rendering in the metalanguage.
as

I

know, no one has studied the issues

in any depth.

I

As far

have been raising

But there is a known puzzle that is relevant

to them and which points up some of the issues here, and the

puzzle shows up in these three statements:

am tali' is true iff

(A)

'I

(B)

'Socrates will sit' is true iff Socrates will sit.

(C)

'A

I

am tall

woman is President' is true iff

a

woman is president.

.
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(A)

is incorrect -it is saidbecause it is not the case

that the sentence

utterer of

(A)

'

I

am tali' is true just in case the

-me- is tall.

(b)

is incorrect because

Socrates is sitting’ has truth conditions
even though
Socrates is dead and will never sit again.

And, if (C) were

correct, since a woman isn't President,
it would seem 'a
woman is President' can never be true,
which is wrong (we
hope). Thus, (A), (B) and (C) are lacking in
a certain kind
of generality that one is accustomed to
seeing in truth

conditions, and if that generality is to be attained,
the

pragmatic features of object language and metalanguage
cannot match so closely that there is homophony.

-Or so it

seems

Actually, things are not so simple.

First, there are

Wittgensteinian ineffability problems about stating these
objections.

For example,

(A)

appeared in indirect

discourse, quoted in effect, and was in point of fact not

localized to me, C.G..

Second, these objections do not take

the tense and inflection seriously of the ’is' that sits
just before the

will sit'

is.

'true'.

In fact, one might claim,

'Socrates

(now) true just in case Socrates will sit.

Third, why is generality not achieved, for example in the

case of tense, by making sure instances of T using enough

different tenses to cover all times are given?

We are used

to semantic theories where the metalanguage is more or less

formal and completely lacking in pragmatic features and

:

.
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where generality is achieved by
explicit universal
quantification over certain sorts of
things.

The standard

theories of tense and indexicals are
like this, and object
language and metalanguage are thus
'hetero-pragmatic’ in
them.
But it doesn't have to be so.
(Given that the
project is to define truth, not explain
how indexicals
work.

)

Now let's look at our second problem.

The structural

conception of truth seems to lead us, if we
are to describe
it in English, to make a lot of
crazy-sounding
claims: that

'snow is green'

is true, and so on.

As we noted earlier,

the structures are just there, and such
statements seem to
describe (part of) them.

Here is a suggestion. Perhaps what happens is that

utterances of
'Snow' denotes grass

and
'Snow is green' is true

give rise to cognitive dissonance, so that we reject them,

without the things claimed being false.

Maybe we read the

quotational part of the sentence, decide by

a

subconscious

induction that what we have in front of us is all English,
and then absorb the rest of the sentence and reject the

claim as

a

claim about English.

sitting your total evidence
you
Chat

’

means cat

set,

So,

in the interest of

let me run this example by
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False, right

?

does mean cat.

Fooled you

1

1

meant the French word, which

Are you now so inclined to reject

'Snow' denotes grass

?

Finally, let us consider our worst
cases.

Snow is white' is true and 'Snow
is white' is false
and
'Snow is white' is true and false.

The former is not so bothersome once we
get it in our head
that the sentences may belong to different
(interpreted)
languages.

(Though perhaps it would be solecistic to

express ourselves in such a way.)
^ or kidden

The latter is perhaps

by some constraint on the interpretation of

utterances that says that

a

single token gets projected to

single interpreted type.
In sum,

all these considerations suggest that it may

well be possible to reconcile English and Tarski.

a
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CHAPTER IV

FIELD'S THEORY

Statement of Field's Theory

In another well-known paper,

'Mental Representation'

([1978]), Field wants to show that it is possible to
give a
ma ^ er a l istical ly adequate account" of mental
properties
-'-

and relations, that is, an account that shows them
not to be

irreducibly mental".

He focusses mainly on belief.

He

gives two accounts of belief, one for the friends of

propositions, and the other for the enemies of propositions
(of whom he is one).

I

for several reasons.

First, it is the one Stalnaker has in

rni.nd.

will only discuss the first account,

Second, the issues are much less clearly joined with

respect to the translation account.

(Even as it is, there

is a bit of slippage between what Field says and what

Stalnaker criticizes.)

Also, a discussion of the

translation account would require

a

lengthy discussion of

translation and of Quine's ideas, the inspiration for
Field's approach.
The core of both accounts is the postulation of

internal language and the claim that there is
belief*, that holds between a person and

a

a

relation,

sentence of her

)

.
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language (that she understands).

Borrowing from Dennett

([1975]), Field says that a
person believes * a sentence S
just in case the person
explicitly stores S or S is an

obvious consequence of sentences
the person explicitly
stores. Belief* and belief are
related as follows
(Apparently, 'p' i s intended to be
schemati c
.

A person X believes that
p iff
X believes* S and S means that
(Cf.

[1978], p.80.)

f or

)

:

some S,

p.

Actually Field defines

a

broader

concept that allows animals to have
beliefs, but we will
just look at the narrower concept.)
Field takes belief* to
be unproblematic from a materialist
point of view and holds
that meaning is unproblematic too, if construed
as follows.
A sentence means

understood as

a

a

proposition, and

set of worlds.

worlds at which it is true.

a

proposition is

A sentence means the set of

Truth at

a

world is defined

using as a basis truth at the actual world, and
truth characterization is used.

Tarskian

a

The atomic clause would

look like this (says Field):
'Pb' is true at w iff
(i) there is some individual x that b denotes

(in

the actual world),
(ii) there is some property Z that P stands for
(in the actual world), and
(iii) in w, x exists and has Z.
([1978], p 86
.

Denotation is done Kripkeanly; Field thinks standing— for can
be done in a materialistically acceptable way.

All the

properties and relations postulated in the theory are
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reasonably materialistic and do not
require mysterious
semantic relations that jump across
worlds. Thus Field has
he thinks, given an account of a
mental relation that will
satisfy the materialist.

Stalnaker's Criticisms of Field

Stalnaker propounds
view.

a

number of objections to this

They fall into three general kinds:
(1) Field fails

in his effort to expunge intentional
relations,

(2)

Tarskian

truth theory can't play the role Field wants it
to play, (3)
the theory is wrong-headed: it is not organized
correctly
and gets the order of explanation wrong.

We will look at

these in turn.
As noted in Chapter One, Stalnaker is trying to
see

whether Field's theory provides
intentionality
a

,

a

naturalistic account of

while Field's original intention was to give

materialistically acceptable account of mental properties.

And, as we noted, intentionality and mentalism diverge.

Thus with respect to the first kind of objection, we need to

keep track separately of whether or not Field has gotten rid
of the mentalism and whether or not he has gotten rid of the

intentionality.
following:

The first four sections below speak to the

Does Field make it plausible that belief-that

can be given an account without the use of any mentalistic

concepts?

Without the use of other intentional concepts?

I

.
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will argue that while many of Stalnaker
flawed

,

's

criticisms are

Field does not accomplish his purpose.

Stalnaker

:

Field Doesn't Get the Intentionality Out

Stalnaker speaks in terms of intentionality and
does
not mention mentalistic concepts per se
He notes two
.

places at which apparently intentional notions
appear in the
theory.
The first is the notion of obvious consequence
used
in defining belief*.

The second is the causal theory of

reference, which uses the notion of speakers' intentions.

A

third place, which Stalnaker does not note, is the

requirement that people only believe* sentences they

understand
Stalnaker describes his conception of Field's project
like this:

The first two moves in Field's project are
successive attempts to relocate the problem of
intentionality in narrower and more tractable
places. The analysis of belief into the belief*
relation and the meaning relation shifts the
locus of representation from mental states to
linguistic objects? then the Tarskian truth
characterization tries to shift the locus of
semantic representation from sentences in general
to simple descriptive expressions.
([1984], p.33)
He thinks that Field fails to accomplish this project and in
fact leaves some intentionality in the first half of the

analysis, instead of expunging it completely.

Let's begin with the notion of obvious consequence.

Stalnaker's criticism here is mentioned briefly in passing

.
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and not developed.

He merely notes that the notion of

obvious consequence is apparently

a

semantical notion and

would have to be spelled out independently
of the meanings
of the sentences if Field is to
accomplish
his project.

suggests this cannot be done.
p

.

17 2

.

)

(See [1984], Ch

.

2,

fn

.

He

4,

He seems to be focussing on the notion
of

consequence.

He does not explicitly comment on the
notion

of obviousness, which would seem to be

a

mental relation,

maybe an intentional one, and which deserves
scrutiny also.
Before examining Stalnaker's objection and
entertaining

possible replies for Field, we need to sort through
the
different ways in which Field's definition can be
understood
and choose one to work with.

Field's definition of belief*,

restricted to human belief, looks like this:
X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or S is

an obvious consequence of sentences X explicitly

stores
(Cf.

[

1978] ,p. 84

.

)

The same phrase that we will shortly be

examining on suspicion of harboring mentalism or

intentionality

,

namely 'is an obvious consequence of', is

one source of ambiguity because it is not clear how to

understand its logical form.
whom?

One wants to know, obvious to

Obvious to X, i.e., to the subject of attribution?

Obvious to us who attribute?

Obvious perhaps to some

counterf actual person epitomizing ordinary rational powers?
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(Field actually gets this part
of his theory from
Dennett except for the notion of
obviousness, which Dennett
,

does not use (cf. [Dennett, 1975]).

device he calls an
agent, and perhaps

’

But Dennett speaks of

extrapolator/inducer

’

a

in the mind of the

'obvious to the subject of attribution’

is the best bet exegetically
speaking.

Dennett merely

discusses the theory and its problems
without either
endorsing or rejecting it outright in this
article.)
A second question is how to understand
the (intended)

logical form of 'is an obvious consequence'.

mean 'is obvious and

a

consequence'; rather,

This does not
'obvious' seems

to be an operator taking more of the sentence
in its scope.

But renderings of Field's account that use 'it is
obvious
that

run into trouble, as we will see below.
A third problem is

'is'.

Field is hoping to capture

a

dispositional notion with his definition: one can be said to

believe* things one has never explicitly considered because
one is disposed in a certain way to 'explicitly store' them.

But 'is' does not do the trick, as we will see, and 'would'

has to be introduced, leading to more problems.
Let us look at these three problems in turn, starting

with obviousness-to—whom.

The idea that the person to whom

the consequences are obvious will be someone other than the

subject of attribution has its attractions.

There are some

things about belief attribution that are or can be oriented
to the attributer rather than the attributee, and if we have

such a thing in the 'obvious' above, then Field has at least
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partial reply to any threat that
obviousness is an
intentional or mental notion: he can
claim to have made
progress in that he has said what it
is for someone to
believe* a sentence and has done so
without utilizing any
further intentional states of the subject
of attribution
(This reply would further require either
that we suppose
that Mentalese is common to both us and
our subject of
attribution or that we revise the proposal using
the notion
of translation. We'll assume that Mentalese
is
a

.

common: it's

simpler and nothing in our dicussion hinges on
it.)
But construing obviousness as obviousness-to-us
will

not work.

Field's proposal suitably revised is

X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S
or

there are sentences X explicitly stores such that
it is

(or would be) obvious-to-us that S follows from

those sentences.

Different things are obvious to different people.

we say

Jones believes that no one would survive

Suppose
a

nuclear

war' and do so on the grounds that a sentence meaning 'no

one would survive a nuclear war' follows obviously (to us)

from sentences Jones believes*.

It is still possible for

Jones not to believe* any sentence meaning 'no one would
survive a nuclear war', even if he is reminded of the

relevant sentences he explicitly stores.

If the above

version of Field's proposal is correct, we would not revise
our claim about Jones's belief in the following situation:
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Jones has been reminded of relevant
sentences he explicitly
stores, he is queried whether anyone
would survive a nuclear
war, and he replies 'I have no opinion
about
that’.

But in

fact we would revise our claim.

Since considerations similar to the
ones just listed
tell against the idea that obviousness is
obviousness to an

idealized observer,

I

conclude that the obviousness involved

must be obviousness for the person who has the
belief.

But

now let us see what happens when we make this
explicit in
the definition and use the operator

that

'it is

obvious to X

1

:

(Dl) X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S
or

(i)

there

are sentences Sl...Sn that X explicitly stores and (ii) it
is obvious to X that S is a consequence of Sl...Sn.

(Field may mean to include both inductive and deductive

consequences in his notion of consequence.

We will just

study deductive consequences, as that is what Stalnaker's

criticism seems directed at.)
problems with (Dl).
if X is not

'on to'

There are a number of

X may never have considered S.

Also,

the concept of consequence (and maybe

even if he is), it is not going to be obvious to him that
is a consequence of Sl...Sn

.

S

It may be that if suitably

stimulated, he would perform the deduction (more or less)

immediately, but performing a deduction and recognizing one
for what it is are different things.

The former notion

:
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would seem to be the relevant one:
people who do not grasp
the notion of consequence nevertheless
have
beliefs.

(And

remember that Field's original, broader,
proposal applied to
animals as well as people.) Here is an
attempt to fix both

problems

(D2) X believes* S iff X explicitly
stores S or for some

Sl.'.Sn that X explicitly stores, X would deduce
less) immediately from

S

(more or

Sl...Sn if X were to consider

S.

Problems: This suffers from the standard defect of

counterf actual definitions.
X considered S

Who knows what would happen if

Maybe the world would blow up before he

?

had a chance to adopt other attitudes towards it.

Or maybe

X just would not happen to perform the deduction — inference

may not be automatic even under the best of circumstances.
A second problem, discussed below, is whether deduction is

merely

a

mental act, and whether if it is, more mentalism or

intentionality is hiding under its cover.
Let's look at the first problem for

a

minute.

Now, the

notion Field is trying to capture is a dispositional one (he
says),

so it is not inappropriate to involve a

counterfactual

;

one just needs to be more selective about

the conditions under which X is supposed counterf actually to
be considering S.

trick?

Would something like the following do the

:
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(

D3

)

X believes* S iff X explicitly
stores S or for some

sentences Sl...Sn that X explicitly
stores, if X considered
S for certain epistemic ends
and in a situation where it was

possible to accomplish those ends, X
would deduce S (more or
less) immediately from Sl...Sn.

Here, we suppose the subject is motivated
in a certain way
as an attempt to rule out certain classes
of counterfactual

situations, such as cases of random spinning
of fancies,

which are

a

problem for (D2).

But (D3) has problems too:

The problems induced by the presence of the
counterfactual
are not completely cleaned up, but more importantly, if
we

take this sort of approach to cleaning them up, a host
of

new mental and intentional notions will start sneaking into
the definition, those involved in the notions of ends, the

accomplishment of ends, and rationality in general.
this does not seem to be in the spirit of Field.

Again,

(Stalnaker

attempts to prevent intentionality sneaking into his own
account by this route when he invokes the notion of
optimality, as we will see in Chapter Five, but this has

problems of its own.)

A better version of Field's proposal,

I

believe, is

this

(D4) X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or there are

sentences Sl...Sn that X explicitly stores such that if X

:
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were to have deduced

S

from Sl...Sn, the deduction would

have been (more or less) immediate.

(I

use

’were to have' and

’would have' to limit

counter factual consideration to worlds where
the deduction
actually gets performed and to prevent certain
kinds of

problems arising from the fact that what counts
as an
obvious deduction can change for

a

person over time.

The

whole thing can be relativized to times explicitly,
but it
is easier just to agree to take the tenses
seriously in any

application of the definition.)
Now, must the deduction performed be correct?

It seems

that neither Field nor Stalnaker, especially Stalnaker,

would want to have just any old drawing of
count as a deduction:

a

conclusion

the deducer must get it right.

They

do not say why they think this, but let us follow their
lead, reserving criticism for later.

Thus we have the final

version of Field's definition, the one we will be working

with

(D5) X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or there are

sentences Sl...Sn which X explicitly stores such that

(i)

S

follows from Sl...Sn, and (ii) if X were to have deduced S

from Sl...Sn, the deduction would have had few steps or one
step.
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believe that this is the best we can
do for Field. The
reader may see ways to object to
the left-to-right half of
the definition (based on the role
belief* is supposed to
Play in construing belief). They could
be ruled out by
further fussing, although we might be
forced to invoke some
kind of intent ionality or mentalism.
We will not pursue
this degree of refinement unless it turns
out there is
nothing more serious to criticize in the
cruder definition,
which it won't.
I

Some final comments: although we are going
along with
the idea that the performance of the deduction must
be the

performance of

a

genuine deduction because Field and

Stalnaker presuppose it, this idea seems dubious.
notion of belief being carved out is too much

a

The

notion of

rational belief (irrational belief is belief too).

capture

a

And to

broader notion of belief, the whole approach would

have to be changed: the work that the notion 'correct

performance of deduction' does cannot be done by
such as

a

notion

'taking the next step in a train of thought'.

Furthermore, even if we do want to limit ourselves to

rational belief, it is very unclear how one would make

a

parallel claim for the inductive drawing of conclusions.
One problem is the notion of obviousness: for deduction, we
can talk about number of steps.

do this for induction.

Not in any clear way can we

What would correspond to the clause

'the deduction would have had few steps or one step'?

'The

induction would have been strong and been recognized to be
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so'?

We don't have

a

syntactic model to appeal to, the way

we do for deduction.

The No tion of Obvious Consequence

Stalnaker thinks the notion of obvious
consequence
sneaks intentionality into Field’s proposal,
and we are also
asking whether it sneaks any mentalistic
concepts in. Given
the version of Field’s proposal we arrived at,
the notion of

obviousness is not going to be the source of the
problem, if
there is one.
Obviousness for consequence is, given what we have
said
above, most reasonably cashed out in terms of something
like

immediacy-or-shortness of deduction, which in turn is cashed
out in terms of performing a deduction (however that is
done) in few steps or one step.

The notion of number of

steps seems fairly non-intentional

,

and it apparently is not

mentalistic, either.
Now that we have ramified the conception of deduction
though, we have to consider the notion of performance of

deduction.

Is it intentional or mentalistic?

This depends

on whether performance needs to be deliberate or whether an

unintentional performance would count.

Clearly the

performance does not have to be consciously deliberate.
a

more subtle kind of deliberateness may be involved.

whole picture may not make sense unless we suppose the

But

The
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deducer to have certain background
goals as part of her
mental e quipage and the deductions
to have something to do
with these.
It is this problem I tried on
Field's behalf to
rule out in the switch from (D3) to (D4),
and it seems to be
coming back in. There, in order to get
away from epistemic
goals, we confined our attention to the
closest worlds
in

which the deductions turn out to be performed.

If the

performance of a deduction is construed as certain
brain
processes, then surely such brain processes could
arise

randomly or be generated by

people

s

brains.

a

scientist sticking probes in

Thus we may find ourselves saying that

both (a) Jones believes so-and-so in virtue of the fact that
some deduction would happen and (b) it would happen in

a

way

that is completely divorced from Jones's understanding,
interests, goals, and abilities.

These latter notions can't

be added in to solve the problem, though, since they are

mental and intentional.
A dialectically possible move for Field is just to put
his foot down, say the picture does make sense, and

challenge his critics to come up with an actual

counterexample to his account of belief (i.e., one based on
this alleged problem).

I

doubt any would be forthcoming.

fancier version of this move is the following.

Earlier, we

were talking about taking the indicative seriously.

Perhaps

Field can insist on our taking the subjunctive conditional
seriously.

A

Since Field is not trying for an analysis, but

only an account, he can insist on our taking seriously the
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relativity of the counterfactual to the
actual world. This,
however, would severely limit the
possible generality of his
proposal, and although he does not say how
general he wants
it to be, perhaps he wants more than
this.
Despite the ways out available to Field, there
is a
problem here, one which has its source not so
much in the
language -of -thought approach as in the fact that Field
is

treating belief both as more basic and as more
isolated from
the notions of intentions and goals than it really
is.

In

order to do Field’s project right, one would need to
develop
a

typology of mental intentional relations and then start at

the bottom, examining the intentionality of the most basic
ones.

Belief is not all that basic.

Representation of

objects is more basic, as are entertainment and acceptance.
Also, assumption seems to be parallel and neither more nor
less basic, suggesting that a typology will be complicated.
(As Meinong pointed out,

assumption is not temporary belief

because one can assume

thing while never ceasing to

a

believe its contrary.)
Now let us consider the notion of consequence, which is

what Stalnaker has in his sights.

What he seems to be

suggesting is that the relevant notion of consequence is
semantic consequence, and that this is

a

problem for Field

because semantic consequence is an intentional relation.
Stalnaker has been misled by his own description of
Field's project.

He spoke of 'relocating the problem of

intentionality in narrower and more tractable places’.

He
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belief has been separated

into belief* and meaning, there is
still semantic

intent ionality to be found in belief*.

But on a correct

conception of what Field is proposing,
the ‘narrower place'
into which the problem of intentionality
has been pushed
just is the realm of semantic intentionality.
If someone
told Field that he had rid his initial
proposal about belief
of all intentional concepts except semantically
intentional
ones, he would be pleased rather than disturbed:
his project
is to boil the problem of intentionality down
to the problem

of semantic intentionality and then to bring in Tarski.
(Granted,

it is not clear how Field proposes to get from

Tarski to semantic consequence.)

Merely the fact that the

notion of consequence involved is semantic, if it is

a

fact,

is not enough to do Field in.

Actually, it is not at all clear what notion of

consequence is intended.

Field does not say, and in

Dennett's original article, deduction has
flavor.

wants

.

a

syntactic

But suppose semantic consequence is what Field

The two main varieties of semantic consequence

available are the model-theoretic one and the world-

theoretic one.

Since we have ramified the notion of

deduction, neither of these will present any special problem
for Field: the deducer does not have to recognize the

consequence for what it is by sorting through different

worlds or different interpretations of non-logical
vocabulary: she just has to get an answer somehow in few or
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one steps

and the answer has to follow from sentences
she
explicitly stores, world-theoretically or
model,

theoretically

,

as the case may be.

We have seen there are

problems with Field's conception of belief*,
and one thinks
of them again here, but no new problems
are introduced by
consequence being semantic, if it is.

The Notion of Understanding a Sentence

Field does not say why he requires that the sentence
that is the object of belief* be understood.

One obvious

problem that this constraint rules out, probably the one
Field has in mind, is that someone might happen to store
sentence of an unknown language,

something he does not believe.
problem.)

a

a

sentence which says

(Dennett mentions this

The problem at least partly arises from Field's

conception of (certain) beliefs as stored sentences, which
is rather a bizarre notion to begin with.

Given we are

going to indulge in metaphor, why not set things up so that
storage is memory?

Precisely what Field needs to solve the

problem of the unknown sentence is

a

way of drawing the

distinction between remembering a sentence and believing it.
In Field's account of belief, storage is something of a

dummy notion or place-holder, but it is supposed to have

materialistic flavor

-

a

the idea of storage of sentences is

supposed to sound reassuringly physical, even mechanistic.

.
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(What Field needs to do, in my opinion,
is to let storage be
memory and find another dummy notion
for construing belief.)
But supposing that Field wants to
maintain his picture of

belief based on the storage of sentences,
what can he
There are two questions: must Field
invoke the notion
understanding a sentence to get out of the
problem of
unknown sentence, and, if he must, how badly
off, how
mental or intensional, is this notion?

say?
of
the

deeply

Now, the relevant conception of understanding
a

sentence is understanding the meaning of

a sentence,

so both

the notion of understanding and the notion of meaning
seem
to be involved.

For Field, meaning is an intentional

notion, but one he thinks he has no reason to fear

-

presumably, this new appearance of the notion of meaning is

ultimately done away with in favor of truth conditions.

According to the tradition Field is drawing on,

understanding

a

sentence is knowing its truth conditions.

Must Field invoke the notion of knowing the truth

conditions of the sentences of Mentalese to get out of the

problem of the unknown sentence?

And is the notion of

understanding a sentence, i.e., knowing its truth
conditions, irretrievably mental or intentional?

No and

probably not
Here is something that can be said to stave off the

problem at least temporarily.

The problem of the unknown

sentence is not at this stage a genuine philosophical
problem, and it should not be treated as if it had that
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status.

It is only a question - a
question engendered by

the storage metaphor.

It does show the proposal is
unclear;

it does not show that a believer
must in addition to storing
a

sentence understand it.

The user of the metaphor can

easily block the alleged problem with
more metaphor: maybe
the storage bin is constructed so that
it will only accept

sentences of Mentalese.

And should we need to invoke the notion of

understanding

a

sentence, i.e., of knowing its truth

conditions, or simply be interested in it, it is
probably
not in principle any worse off than belief itself,
allowing
for the fact that its explication in naturalistic
terms is

more complex.
knowledge*,

Probably Field would postulate a notion of

just as he did a notion of belief*.

One thing that is very unclear about Field's theory is
the relation between a propositional attitude and its

internal 'asterisk' counterpart when the propositional

attitude is not basic.
is fairly basic.)

true belief.

(Field acts as if he supposes belief

Knowledge is non-def ectively justified

Is there such a thing as knowledge*

does it consist

?

?

Would the following two principles be

equivalent, or would they give us something to choose

between

In what

?:

X knows that p iff for some S, X knows* S
and S means that p
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X knows that p iff for some S, X
believes* S,
S is true,

S is

non-

def ectively justified* for X,
and

S

means that p

Again, Field needs a typology

1

But

I

see no reason in

principle why there could not be one and why
the different
attitudes -belief, knowledge, etc.- could not
all be

construed as attitudes toward sentences.
This is not to say that a Fieldian view about
knowledge
of truth conditions would not be open to other
known

problems.

A standard problem for the language-of-thought

approach has always been the status of Mentalese: does it
have meaning, does the thinker understand its meaning, and
if so,

in what language does this understanding take place?

Field discusses this problem (in
connection) and replies to it.

a

slightly different

He quotes Harman's statement

of the problem, originally aimed at Davidson.

(This is

Harman speaking):
Davidson would (presumably) say that the speaker
understands [the sentence 'Snow is white']
by virtue of the fact that he knows it
is true if and only if snow is white.
The difficulty... is that [for the speaker to know
any such thing he] needs some way to represent
to himself snow's being white.
If the
relevant speaker uses the words 'snow is
white to represent in the relevant way that
snow is white ,... Davidson s [theory] would
be circular. And, if speakers have available
a form of Mentalese in which they can represent
that snow is white, so that the [theory avoids]
circularity, there is still the problem of
meaning for Mentalese.
'

'
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(Quoted in [1978], p.101.

Bracketed interpolations are

Field's.)
a

What Field says in reply is that the
semantics of
system of internal representation must
ascribe truth

conditions, not knowledge of truth conditions
to the
sentences of Mentalese ([1978], p.101).
I guess the idea is
that we should substitute the notion of
having truth

conditions for the notion of understanding truth
conditions
when it comes to Mentalese.
this possibly be

?

But what could the force of

We already believed that Mentalese would

have truth conditions; that's part of what is supposed
in
the idea that Mentalese is a language.

Let

s

transmogrify the objection and the reply into

form directly relevant to the present discussion.
that for me, Mentalese is French.

Let's say that

a

Suppose
I

believe

that snow is white in virtue of storing the sentence 'La

neige est blanche'.
this sentence,

conditions are.

I

Now Field holds that

understand it, i.e.,

I

not only store

I

know what its truth

And presumably for Field knowledge is to be

defined by appeal to knowledge*, like this:
X knows that p iff for some S, X knows*
S

S

and

means that p.

An instance of this definition that captured my knowledge of
the truth conditions of 'La neige est blanche'

will abbreviate 'N') would look like this:
C.G. knows that: N is true iff snow is white

IFF

(which we
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for some S, C.G. knows* S, and

S

means

that: N is true iff snow is white.

Let's agree to call the relevant
sentence

there’s just one),

understand S*.

'S*'.

I

know* (we assume

According to Field's theory,

I

Perhaps S* is

neige est blanche' est vraie iff
la neige est blanche.

Again,

I

would be

would have to understand S*, and understanding S*
a

matter of knowing its truth conditions.

A

certain kind of infinite regress is generated: we never
reach a stopping point from which we can explain in what

understanding

a

given sentence consists.

If we just mechanically transmogrify Field's reply to

Harman for the present context, we get: the semantics for
Internal French must ascribe truth conditions, not knowledge
of truth conditions to the sentences of Internal French.
Well, the semantics for Internal French do just ascribe

truth conditions, and the regress would still be there.

It

seems to me that what Field must do here is either drop the
idea that the sentences of internal language are understood,

ruling out the problem of the unknown sentence in some other
way as suggested above, or say that one can understand

sentences of internal language in other ways than by

explicitly knowing their truth conditions.

:

.
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The Notion o f Intention and the Causal
Theory

Stalnaker accuses Field of hiding intentionality
in the
causal theory of reference. According
to the the causal
theory, when a name is passed on from person
to person in
such a way as to constitute a chain of
reference, the person
hearing the name for the first time intends to use
it with
the same reference that the person from whom
he heard it
does (cf. [Kripke, 1972], p. 96).

The concept of an

intention is both mentalistic and intentional: if it
is

instantiated

a

thinker exists, and intentions are about

things
The causal theory actually seems to get invoked twice
in Field

s

theory, once for external language, and once for

internal language (1).

It seems only to be explicitly

invoked in connection with external language, though Field
is very unclear about this.

The schema with which it all

began is
A person X believes that p iff for some S,
X believes* S and S means that p.

The

'p'

is schematic, or seems to be.

But then Field

suggests that meaning is to be explicated in terms of truth
at a world, and he gives his base clause for a truth

characterization
Pb is true at w iff there is an object x that
b denotes (in the actual world) and a property Z
that P stands for (in the actual world), and w is
a world in which x exists and has Z
([1978], p.86)
'

'
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In an instantiation, the Quine
corners would become

quotation marks.

It is unclear how these two
definitions

are supposed to fit together.

With respect to external

language, what kind of principles
would legitimate
inferences involving both the schematic 'p'
and quotation
marks?
(I don't say there aren't any.)
With respect to
internal language, how can we quote it? Field
does not

contemplate how explicitly to combine the two.

Here is one

suggestion that perhaps captures what Field has in
mind ('p'
is schematic and is in Quine corners
at its appearance on

the righthand side of the biconditional, but not
the left):
A person X believes that p iff X believes* some

sentence

which

'p'

S

and S means the set of worlds at
is true.

This seems to be in the spirit of Field, and we will adopt
it as our working hypothesis about what he meant.

Now, here is an instance of this principle, articulated

so as to emphasize the place at which the causal theory of

reference for external language comes forward:

(A)

Jones believes that Poppy is

believes* S and

S

a

spy iff for some

S

Jones

picks out the set of worlds wherein that

which 'Poppy' actually denotes is in the extension of that
which 'spy' actually stands for.

:
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It seems to be assumed that
Mentalese is a denotational

language, and so there is an implicit
idea that if Jones has
a belief about some thing, then
there is a mental vocabulary
item in Jones's internal language that
denotes that thing.
Here is another consequence of Field's theory
with external
denotation suppressed and internal denotation
brought

forward

(B)

If Jones believes that Poppy is a spy then
for some S,

Jones believes*

S,

and

contains a denotational expression

S

partly in virtue of which

S

means that Poppy is

a spy.

Whichever kind of denotation Stalnaker is worrying about,
Field has

a

reply that will save the language— of— thought

approach, though there will be some cost.

With respect to

the denotation done by bits of internal language, even if we

suppose there to be some kind of causal relation present, we

certainly would not want to say that intending to use names
as others do is involved, or that any overt intentions at

all are.

The causal theory of reference belongs to a

tradition that seeks to solve certain puzzles about external
language, and it is part of Kripke's solutions that the
links in the chain be held together by intentions.

But the

same problems do not exist for denotation by internal

language, and similar intentions will thus not be invoked
and are not a problem.

Field is not threatened, except by

the criticism that he has not been very forthcoming about

104

denotation for internal language

(a

criticism we will

discuss below).

Anyway, he is not threatened by any
extra
intent ionality from 'intends'.

As for the other place at which
denotation enters the
theory (see (A) above), this does not
threaten Field,
either.
Field's available reply is that the mental
attitude
invoked, that of intention, is not an attitude
of Jones; he
also can say (following a suggestion in
[Kaplan 1989]) that
the concept of intention is not part of the
meaning or

analysis of 'denotes'.

described in

a

In (A),

the content of the belief is

way that is oriented to the audience of the

claim -us- rather than to any object of the claim -e.g.
Jones.

On this view, Jones may represent Poppy with

something very unlike the name 'Poppy', both internally and
externally.
if it is,

And part of what makes the equivalence correct,

is our linguistic practices

(yours and mine, dear

reader), not Jones's.

Perhaps the conditions for Jones's belief cannot be

assertively stated

,

given Field's approach, without

implicating the existence of the intentions of the stater
(and various attitudes of the audience as well).
is not a problem for Field.

But that

If our intentions are not

entailed, what Field can say is that Stalnaker has confused
a

feature of what it takes to assert the account with

a

feature of the account itself.

Conclusion: In

a

sense, we have uncovered some

intentionality in the theory, but it is not where Stalnaker
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said it would be.

It lies in -it is- the notion of

denotation for Mentalese, about which Field
is so unduly
reticent.
One cannot exactly accuse Field of having
missed
it
since his theory is set up around it, but
'

one can say

that he will not be judged to have succeeded
in his project
until he explains this central notion.

Preliminary Conclusions

We have now examined all the places in Field's theory
that Stalnaker singled out where mentalism and

intentionality threatened to creep in (and more).
conclusions can we draw
Stalnaker

's

What

?

criticisms do not convince.

Field has

replies to charges that mental ism is hidden in the notions
of obvious consequence and the causal theory of reference.
It's true that there is more intentionality in the theory

than Field is very explicit about, but as long as he sticks
to his guns, i.e., to truth theory plus denotation, for

construing mental linguistic intentionality, Stalnaker
comments do not threaten him.

's

We have also seen that there

is a reply to be made to the idea that the requirement that

one understand one's internal sentences sneaks in

unaccounted-for intentionality, although that notion may be

problematic in other ways.

The only serious threat of

intentionality or mentalism comes in the notion of
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background goals or of rationality of
belief, which
Stalnaker does not mention.
In a sense, Field’s available
replies are too easy,

though.

Whenever someone points out

a

semantically

intentional notion sneaking in. Field
can say, ’Semantic
intent lonality does not bother me'. For
a mentally

intentional notion, typically an attitude,
Field can say,
'Oh, that’s an attitude toward a
sentence.
Each attitude is
a different way of treating mental
sentences'.
This is not

going to be convincing until Field develops

a

typology of

mental relations and explains what the different
treatments
are.

When we discussed knowledge and knowledge*, we saw

what kinds of questions can arise, and although
belief is
less complicated than knowledge,

it is not basic,

either.

Another problem for Field is that his account of belief
is too much an account of rational belief.

Field is taking, which makes belief

a

The approach

dispositional notion,

requires maintaining some kind of limitations on the
counter factual situations in which one might come to have
belief, and Field does it with the notion of (obvious)

consequence, which we are construing as (short) deduction.
But there does not seem to be any natural generalization

that would cover irrational belief.

If deduction goes out

the window, what will limit the counterf actual situations?

Field meant to establish the bona fides of the

language-of-thought approach with his account of belief.

Although Stalnaker has not shown that his approach is not

a

.
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viable. Field has not done this.

Probably he chose the

wrong mental concept to work on.

Belief is a more

complicated and less basic mental relation than
one might
think, and understanding it in terms
of 'storage'
of

sentences is too simplistic.
Let us consider briefly the notion of
having-a-memorythat.

Now, understanding memory in terms of storage
of

sentences is simplistic too, but perhaps it is not
overly

simplistic for our purposes.

And if Field could give

a

'materialistically acceptable account' of memory-that, this

would go just as far toward establishing his approach as
such an account of belief would.

Consider

X has a memory that p iff for some S, X stores S

and
(Some people object to the phrase
is okay in my idiolect.

be made with respect to

means that p.

S

'has a memory that'.

The points
'X

I

It

want to make can also

has a memory of P's being Q',

though the parallelism is not as direct.)

Memory does not

presuppose rationality, if construed broadly enough.

It

does not embody a dispositional notion, and it does not

require background goals.

This is much less problematic

than Field's proposal and goes just as far towards showing
that mental intentionality can be explained

naturalistically
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Stalnaker

:

Tarskian Truth Doesn't Do What Field Wants

The second set of problems Stalnaker
raises for Field
falls under the general heading,
Tarskian truth theory does
not meet the demands that Field wants
to place on it.
Field
wants Tarskian truth theory plus the causal
theory of
reference to bear the entire burden of construing
the

meaning relation.

Stalnaker raises two problems.

The first

is that Field is wrong to think that Tarski
succeeded in

reducing truth to primitive denotation.

Stalnaker says he

has been convinced by Field's valence analogy that
"a

definition of primitive denotation by enumeration makes
no

contribution to a naturalistic explanation of

intentionality "
analogy:

.

But he sees another application for the

He asks whether the recursive rules of

a

Tarskian

truth characterization are any better off than the

specification of denotation.

"I

don't think so," he says,

"for they are essentially just definitions by enumeration
too,

for various classes of complex expressions" ([1984],

p.30).

Just as the listlike specification of the denotation

function did not give the physical basis for denotation, so

these recursive rules

establish an extensional equivalence between
ascriptions of truth to sentences and
ascriptions of primitive denotation to the
ultimate constituents of sentences, but... do
not tell us any more about the basis for
those ascriptions than does a definition of
primitive denotation by enumeration.
([1984], p.30)

.
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Stalnaker

'

s

second criticism is related to this one.

He

thinks it is conceivable that at some
point in the recursion
the physicalistic basis for meaning might
suddenly be
different. He uses the analogy of valence
again, noting
that not only do elements have valences,
but so do certain
stable configurations of elements, radicals.
He says
It is conceivable that the physical explanation
of wh Y elements combine together in the way
predicted by valence theory be quite different
from the physical explanation of why radicals
combine together, and with elements, in the way
predicted by the valence theory.
([ 1984 ], p. 31

)

As for radicals, so, possibly, for some of the larger

expressions of

a

language.

This discussion drifts pretty far from Tarski.
sake of accuracy, let's note the following.

For the

Tarski did not

think that truth reduced to primitive denotation alone, even
for denotational languages.

to purely logical notions.

He thought that truth reduced
Also, the ultimate step in

reduction involves satisfaction, not denotation per se
Also, denotation for predicates, which Stalnaker and Field

are presupposing, is

a

nouveau addition.

But in the interest of having the issue joined, let us

think in Fieldian terms as Stalnaker is, adopt the idea that

predicates denote, and simply forget about reduction.
just take Stalnaker

's

Let's

two objections to point to the same

gap in Field's theory and to combine to make an objection

that says that Field has considered the physicalistic basis

only for part of the truth-theoretic recursion.

110

One minimal but in my opinion
dialectically adequate
response is to say that the burden
of proof is on Stalnaker
here.
Sure, some new kind of physical
basis might pop up
farther out in the recursion, but why
should we suppose it
will ? Stalnaker has said nothing
to make this plausible.
He could have though, so let me
say it, and then we will see
if any reply is available for Field.
It is implausible to think that the
parts of the

recursion concerned solely with assigning truth
values on
the basis of truth values already assigned
are going to have
a

physical basis in which something new pops up at
some

point far out in the recursion.
kinds of places where

a

This leaves only a few

new element can creep in: the atomic

clause and the quantifier clause, or those clauses as they
combine with others.

The atomic clause in

a

typical truth

characterization goes as follows (Field's has extra
complications not relevant here):
Pb

is true iff the object

of the set

'

P'

'b

1

denotes is a member

denotes.

The function of this clause in a truth characterization is
to make explicit the semantic effect of a certain syntactic

operation we will call 'syntactic predication'.

It is not

the case that syntactic predication denotes anything (it is
not a symbol, but a property of symbols).

But it is

correlated, by this clause, with set membership, without

denoting set membership.

Ill

Well, seemingly, here is one place for
something new to
creep into the physicalistic basis for
meaning.
Field has
said nothing about a physicalistic basis
for the

coordination of syntactic predication and set
membership,
and this is something one could ask about:
in virtue of what
physical properties or events is syntactic predication

coordinated with set membership?
The only way out
our

can see for Field here is to adopt

I

'structuralist' interpretation of Tarski, at least for

the recursive clauses of the truth definition, if not for

primitive denotation.

The notion of structure, obscure

though it may be, contains nothing that need alarm the
physicalist.

It is uncontroversial that the physical world

has structure and it is uncontroversial that structure has

something to do with meaning.

What Field can say with respect to syntactic

predication is that the criticism is misplaced.

All it

takes to give the 'physical basis' which 'constitutes' the
fact that the sentence 'Socrates is wise' means that

Socrates is wise is to observe that the following set of
facts is part of a certain homomorphism we know as

(interpreted) English:

denotes Socrates,

'Socrates' causal-theoretically

'wise'

stands for/denotes

wisdom, the

sentence 'Socrates is wise' has the structure of

a

syntactic

predication, syntactic predication and set membership have

a

parallel structure, and in any world where Socrates is wise,
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parallel instances of syntactic predication
and set
membership are realized.
Field can say that what we do know about
the recursion
-that the basic vocabulary denotes, and that
similarity
of

structure between syntax and semantics is maintained
no
matter how far out you go in the recursion- is enough
to
explain the physicalistic basis for meaning completely.

A

similar story could perhaps be told about quantification,

though this is too complicated an issue to be taken up here.

Stalnaker

:

Field's Approach Is Misguided

The third type of criticism that Stalnaker directs

against Field is metatheoretic criticism: he thinks the way
Field goes about constructing his theory is wrong-headed and
gets the explanatory relations wrong.
'atomistic'

The theory is

(that's bad), and it ignores the fact that "it

is conceivable that beings might inquire, deliberate,

calculate and speculate without being able to share the
fruits of their thought with fellow beings" ([1984], p.41).

Let's look at these two points in turn.
By saying of a theory that it is atomistic, Stalnaker

means "it holds that the most basic kind of representation
relation -the kind from which all other representational
relations derive- is

a

relation between linguistic

atoms ... and elements of the world" ([1984], p.34).
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Stalnaker is thinking of

—

-

ge:

—lloso Phy

a

view that Dummett expounds in

of Language and elsewhere.

Roughly the

view is that one cannot explain how
language works without
explaining the things it is used for. The
form a theory of
semantic meaning takes is constrained by the
fact that it
must fit into a larger theory of the things
one can do with
language: the 'moves' (assertions, commands,
questions) one
can make in a language game. An atomistic
approach

precludes this.

Dummett does not define atomism (anywhere

I

can find), but it is plain that he would consider
Tarski's

theory (as we have interpreted it) atomistic: denotation
functions are specified without invoking the role denotation

plays in making assertions, giving commands, and so forth.

Denotation is specified in
Stalnaker

's

a

vacuum, as it were.

point goes by very quickly, but

what he means to say is that

a

I

think

proper general linguistic

theory is organized as Dummett describes and that Field's

atomistic approach precludes his views being part of such

a

theory.

Once again it is unclear whether this application of

Dummett

'

s

ideas is supposed to constutute an objection to

Field's theory of meaning for external language or internal
langugage.

It is not clear that external denotation-by-

causal-chain should be declared atomistic: intending to use
expressions as others do may involve having intentions about
what moves one would make in language games using them.
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And even Tarskian denotation can perhaps
meet Dummett's
demand.
It is not irrelevant to what we
can do with
sentences in language games that denotation is
a function
In order to assert something about
someone, for example, we
must deter mine him or pick him out for our
audience:
.

functionality is relevant to making moves in language
games.
A 'move' such as making an assertion may be composed
of

other moves, such as 'picking out' and 'saying of'.

With respect to internal language, Field can say that
even if this picture of how external language is to be

understood is correct, Stalnaker needs to show that it
applies to Mentalese.
moves in

In no obvious sense does one

'make

language game' in Mentalese.

a

Perhaps there is an unobvious sense, though.

There is

an intuitive correspondence between certain mental acts and

certain speech acts.

Occurrent belief corresponds to

assertion; wondering corresponds to interrogation; intending

someone to do something corresponds to the imperative; and
an attitude somewhere between entertaining and assuming

corresponds to certain uses of clauses.

Maybe we could

think of occurrent belief, wondering, etc., as moves in the

mental language game.
(These ideas are based on those of Meinong in On

Assumption
have said.

,

although he would not agree with everything

I

Meinong had an interesting theory of semantic

and pragmatic meaning according to which an assertion

pragmatically expresses the presence of an occurrent belief
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(or

judgment'), an uninflected clause
pragmatically
expresses the presence of a certain attitude
that lies
between entertaining and assuming, (which
Meinong called
assumption'), etc.
In addition, Meinong had something

Field needs and lacks,

a

typology of mental relations.)

The Stalnaker-Dummett objection transmogrified
would
be: Field's theory doesn't take account of
the role the

internal sentences play in mental acts such as belief,

assumption, intending, wondering, etc.

But that is of

course exactly what Field is trying to take account of.
Presumably, the claim would be that an atomistic theory of

denotation for Mentalese would prevent his theory from
9 e tting off the ground.

irrelevant here.

But atomistic meaning seems to be

In the tradition in which Field is

working, the roles of the internal sentences are construed

mechanically, in terms of storage of sentences, detachment
of consequents, and such things.

Is It Possible to Think Without Language?

The second of the two metatheoretical criticisms was
that it was conceivable that there be thoughts that cannot
be expressed in language.

This criticism occurs in a

context where the 'big pictures' -the pragmatic picture and
the linguistic picture- are being contrasted, to the

disadvantage of the linguistic picture, and is not
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specifically aimed at Field, although Field is taken
to be
the main representative of the linguistic
picture. Aimed at
Field's particular theory in the present dialectical
context, the point seems a weak one.

Stalnaker's words need

to be interpreted as making a very strong claim about
the

nature of thought that goes like this: thought is such that
it is possible for there to be thoughts that cannot even
in

principle be expressed linguistically.

Presumably if

thought were (like) the utilization of language, this claim

would be untrue.
claim

-

Stalnaker does not offer any basis for his

presumably it is supposed to have the status of an

intuition.

But are intuitions about what is and is not

possible of any use here?
intuitions?

Are there even any clear

If there is a language of thought, and if

thinking is utilizing it in various ways, the utilization
does not happen at a conscious level, so certainly

phenomenological intuitions are of no use.

Is the intuition

supposed to be a logical intuition about the relationship

between these two concepts: thought and linguistic
expression?

Other Criticisms

Further study of Field's proposal yields several more
problems.

Field is very cavalier about postulating

a

language of thought without telling us anything about what

.
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it is like or whether experiencing
the use of such a

language is part of the phenomenology of
mental experience.
He also does not discuss the issue of
types versus tokens of

mental language, and the problem of whether
there is a
common mental language, how we could know if
there was, and
what true* means as applied to private experience.

Consideration of these and related issues leads to more
criticisms

The Problem of Different Types of Representation

Does pictorial thinking, aural thinking, geometrical
and topological intuition, and so forth, count as

utilization of the language of thought?

If so, the

language (s) of thought would seem to be rather different
than external language.

If not, we must suppose some common

background language which does ... -what ?
pictorial (e.g.) representations?

representations?

Translates

Describes the

Records their content (whatever 'their

content' might be)?

Each of the two alternatives leads to trouble.

pictorial mental representations as

a

Using

paradigm, let's

consider the first alternative: pictorial representations
(such as one receives as a result of the use of the eyes)

comprise one of the languages of thought.

I f

we believe

something, according to Field, then there is some sentence
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in our language of thought that means
that thing.

What on

earth would count as a sentence, given that
sentences

include these pictures?

Field never says what shall count

as a sentence, and he is relying on our
intuitive

understanding of the concept of

a

sentence, an understanding

derived completely from consideration of sentences of
external language.

He may be thinking of pictures, sounds,

etc., as sentence- like

.

If he means

'there is some thing in

our pictorial system of thought very like an external

sentence...', his claim is unsubstantiated.

If,

on the

other hand, he means 'there is some thing in our system of

pictorial thought that resembles, but also significantly
differs from an external sentence.

•

.

'

,

then it is not just

a

given that one can invoke the notion of truth.
The second alternative had three folds: either

pictorial representations are translated into Mentalese, or
they are described in Mentalese, or their content is

recorded in Mentalese.

The notion of translation, like the

notion of truth, does not seem to apply to pictorial
representations.

As for description, obviously not just any

old description of a pictorial representation is suited to
the uses to which we put such representations.

A

description that recorded the division of my visual array
into rows and columns of 'pixels' or minimum perceptibles
and the color of each pixel would miss the content of the

picture: We would have
1A pale green/IB pale green/lC medium green... etc.

.
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instead of
little green men from Mars

1

The description would have to capture content.

But there

may well be no such thing as ’the' content of a
picture.
Some pictures may be so rich that no finite list of

sentences can capture all the content they record.

And some

may be too poor to determine content (in the propositional
sense of 'content').

third and last fold is that content is recorded in
Mentalese.

But now we have a new kind of intentionality to

deal with: the representational content of

a

picture.

For

the reasons just listed, it is not clear how the

representational content of

a

picture can be assimilated to

linguistic intentionality as Field's strategy requires.
It was the notions of truth and Tarskian truth

conditions that gave Field's view what power it had to

dissolve the problem of intentionality.

The view is in

danger of being uninterestingly trivial if Field is reduced
to saying that belief-that-P is a relation between a person
and a language-like item somehow related to P.

Consonance with the Semantics of 'Believes' Is Lacking

Field is not putting forward his proposal about belief
as an analysis of the concept belief, a rendering of the
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logical form of

'X

believes that P', truth conditions for

belief-sentences, or

a

theory about belief attribution.

proposal comes in the form of

a

The

material biconditional that

is supposed to live up to the following
claim:

it provides a

materialistically acceptable account" of the mental
relation, belief.
Field does not say much more

than this.

He seems to want to demand more of his proposal
than that it
just record an accidental concomitance, but
he does not say

what more.

Despite not knowing exactly what kind of theory Field
is presenting, we can draw certain connections between
what

he says and the idea of giving truth conditions for

sentences of the form

'X

believes that P'.

An instance of

the theory is

Sam believes that Poppy is a spy iff for some
Sam believes*

S

and

S

S,

is true in all the worlds

where 'Poppy is a spy' is true.
(Here we will only be interested in the reading where

substitutions for 'Poppy' are problematic
dicto reading.)

-

the so-called de

Now, here are some bad consequences for

Field derived from our intuitions about the semantics of
belief.

It is easy to show that a consequence of his theory

is that if Sam believes that George is a spy, then Sam

believes that Poppy is

a spy,

given that George is Poppy.

Let's call this 'the problem of equivalence'.
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Another problem involving belief attribution
is
illustrated by the following sentence:
Mary believes that her ugly old flatware
is
going to win

a

prize at the Antiques Show.

This can be said truly when it is the speaker who
thinks the

flatware is ugly and Mary thinks it is beautiful, even on
the

dj?

in.

According to Field's view,

dicto

1

reading, i.e., on the one we are interested

Mary believes that her ugly old flatware is going
to win a prize at the Antiques Show
iff

there is some sentence
S

S

such that Mary believes*

and S means that (i.e. is true in exactly the worlds

where) Mary's ugly old flatware is going to win a prize
at the Antiques Show,

which surely is wrong (again, reading the description de
dicto

)

.

Let's call this 'the problem of point of view'.

We adopted as one of our desiderata that Field's and

Stalnaker's accounts of belief should not jar our
intuitions, shaky though they may be after all these years,

about the semantics of belief.

But Field's account does.
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Another problem involving belief attribution
is
illustrated by the following sentence:
Mary believes that her ugly old flatware
is
going to win a prize at the Antiques Show.
This can be said truly when it is the
speaker who thinks the
flatware is ugly and Mary thinks it is beautiful,
even on
the

de dicto

in.

According to Field's view.

1

reading, i.e., on the one we are interested

Mary believes that her ugly old flatware is going
to win a prize at the Antiques Show
iff

there is some sentence
S

and

S
)

S

such that Mary believes*

means that (i.e. is true in exactly the worlds

Mary

s

ugly old flatware is going to win a prize

at the Antiques Show,

which surely is wrong (again, reading the description de
dicto

)

.

Let's call this 'the problem of point of view'.

We adopted as one of our desiderata that Field's and

Stalnaker's accounts of belief should not jar our
intuitions, shaky though they may be after all these years,

about the semantics of belief.

But Field's account does.

?

)
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Conclusions

How does Field's theory stand up to the
demands we
listed
Chapter One? Our first question was, can
Field
give an account of a mentalistic concept
without using other
mental istic ) concepts? We saw that belief is
problematic,

m

(

that it may presuppose some kind of background
goals, but

that Field may be able to give an account of memory.
Is there some hope on Field's approach of showing

belief to be continuous with other mental concepts, and
not
just propositional ones?

It is hard to see how.

Field runs

into problems even with pictorial representation: how is the

language -of -thought approach supposed to stretch to cover
'

feels happy

'

Is the treatment of belief consonant with our

intuitions about the semantics of 'believes'?

No.

(Although most our theories about the semantics of
'believes' are not consonant with them, either, so this may

be a bit unfair

.

Is the claim of a physicalistic basis for

intentionality made plausible in some way and not just
asserted?

No.

Even a little bit of a story about how

sentences stored as beliefs and sentences stored as desires
interact with each other that accorded with our intuitions
about how belief and desire work would have gone

toward this, but Field offers nothing.

a long

There is also

way

a

gaping hole where there should be an account of denotation

.
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for Mentalese.

If there is an argument for the
view,

it

goes something like this: Semanticalism
and mentalism are
repugnant to the scientific mind and so
can't be right. But
Tar ski-plus-causal -theory is the only
available coherent
theory about mental and semantic intentionality
that does
not invoke semanticalism and mentalism.
So our best guess
is that it is the correct theory.

But as Stalnaker shows,

and as we will see in the next chapter, there
is an

alternative
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CHAPTER V

STALNAKER

In this chapter

'

THEORY COMPARED TO FIELD'S

S

will present Stalnaker's theory of

I

intent lonality and some criticisms of it that have
emerged
in the literature.

Chapter Four, and
and Field.

The chapter is constructed to parallel
I

will interleave comparisons of Stalnaker

In the final section,

I

will summarize the

conclusions of the comparison, which will also be the
conclusions of the dissertation.

Stalnaker's Theory

Stalnaker holds that when we say of something that it

weighs 200 pounds or is six feet tall, we assert

between a physical object and

a

non-physical one,

a

relation
a number.

This relationship, he thinks, is not problematic for the

physicalist, or ought not be: measurement theory gives us an

explication of the relationship.

The family of properties

which are weights of physical objects have

a

structure in

common with the real numbers, and in virtue of this, we can
(given a standard unit) use different numbers to pick out

different ones of these properties: given the unit pound
the number 10 picks out

a

certain property that some

,
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relatively small objects share, and the number
200 picks out
a property that some rather
larger objects
share.

Stalnaker takes this as

a

model for explicating certain

relationships between people and propositions,
which are
also abstract. He sees an intuitive analogy
between the
situation facing the philosopher who wishes to
understand
the relation of physical objects to measures
of weight and

the situation of the philosopher who wishes to
understand

belief (or other attitude), which holds between
a

proposition.

define
a

a

He says

"

a

person and

[t]he analogy suggests that to

relation between

person or

a

proposition is to define

a

a

physical object and

class of properties with a

structure that makes it possible to pick one of the

properties out of the class by specifying
([1984], p.ll).

a

proposition"

An example of the sort of fact Stalnaker

hopes can be explained using the measurement theory model

would be this: that by specifying

a

proposition to the

effect, say, that John is tall, e.g. with the phrase '(that)

John is tall
a

'

,

I

can pick out a belief of Mary (or

a

wish or

wondering whether or...).
He discusses three relations that he thinks fit the

model: needing it to be the case that, tending to bring it

about that, and indication.

He then proposes that belief is

a species of indication and that a combination of belief and

desire is

a

species of tending to bring it about that.

This

is his strategy for showing how it is possible to give a

naturalistic account of the intentional relations, belief

.
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and belief-cum-desire

.

He thinks he has met the challenge

implicit in Field's claim that the only
viable candidate for
giving a naturalistic account involves the
postulation of a
language of thought.
A Tarskian truth characterization has no
role in any of
this.
For Stalnaker, a truth characterization has a very

limited role to play, specifically in relation to external
language.

As sketched in Chapter One, Stalnaker endorses

a

version of Lewis's idea that the convention in virtue of

which we speak (say) English is

a

convention of

'truthfulness and trust', and he thinks the way this

convention is perpetuated is by our passing on

small

a

number of basic conventions embedding basic truth

conditions
In some ways, Stalnaker mimics Field as he constructs

his theory, and to some extent, propositions play the role
in Stalnaker

's

theory that sentences play in Field's.

Both

carry logical structure, but for Stalnaker logical structure
is not sentential structure,

defined using sets of worlds.

it is a boolean structure

A proposition is

a set of

worlds, and one proposition entails another, for example, if
the one set of worlds is a subset of the other.

One thing

at issue between Stalnaker and his critics, including Field,
is whether Stalnaker can get away with this minimal amount

of logical structure, or whether he needs the extra

structure that sentences provide.

-
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As we noted

,

two examples are presented to establish

the viability of the general approach.

It is convenient to

present Stalnaker' s two examples in two sets
of definitions.
The first set is aimed at defining the
general
type of

relation under which belief cum -desi re falls,
tending-to-

bring-about-that

,

which in turn is defined using the notion

of an eqilibrium state.

(Dl)

State S is an equilibrium state of system or object

=df when

(

D2

)

x

is in S,

State S is

=df when

x

a

x

tends to remain in

x

S.

disequilibrium state of system or object

is in S,

x

tends to change in ways that bring

x

x

into its equilibrium state.

(D3) x tends-to-bring-about-that P iff P is a logical or

causal consequence of

x

being in its equilibrium state.

Claim: Belief- cum -desire is a kind of tendency-to-bring-

about

.

(Cf.

[1984], p. 12.

As Stalnaker gives them the

definitions seem to presuppose that an object has only one

equilibrium state.)

The genus of representation and belief is indication.

Indication can occur when there is an object and
'alternative (possible) states' of the object.
for Stalnaker, can represent:

a set of

Such states,
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(Dl) Given a state A of an object
x, A is an alternative

state of

x

iff A is intrinsic to x and A tends under
normal

or optimal conditions ('fidelity conditions')
to correlate

with the environment in some systematic way, and
be in A because the environment is the way it is.

x

tends to

Principle: If A is an alternative state of an object
there is a 1-1 function

f

x

x

indicates that

alternatives of

appropriate

f,

x

is in A iff the

is in f(A).

(D2) Given an object,
x,

then

such that necessarily if normal or

optimal conditions obtain, then

environment of

x,

x,

x,

and

P iff for

(i)

x

a

set of alternative states of

some A in the relevant set of

is in A, and (ii)

for some

the proposition that the environment of

x

is

in state f(A) entails P.
(Cf. p.13 of [Stalnaker,

1984].)

Claim: belief (i.e., belief that) is

a

kind of indication.

Example: When Mary believes that Poppy is a spy, Mary is in
a

belief state that, under optimal conditions, she is only

in if Poppy is a spy, and, under optimal conditions, she is
in that belief state either because Poppy is a spy or

because of something that entails that Poppy is

a spy.
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We now turn to the various criticisms
that have been offered
of Stalnaker s theory.
'

Is There Hidden Intentionality in
Stalnaker's Theory?

A standard strategy to take against

a

claimed solution

to 'the problem of intentionality' is to try to
expose

hidden intentionality in the solution.
this strategy against Field.

We saw Stalnaker use

One place where there is

a

danger of discovering hidden intentionality in Stalnaker's
account is in the notion of optimality.

(Stalnaker says

almost nothing about optimality and recognizes that he has
some filling out to do.

)

On reading through the definitions

for the first time, one is struck by an apparent need for

optimality to include epistemic optimality.
take

a

For example,

belief that is arrived at through one's vision: if

such a belief is arrived at under optimal conditions, then
it is arrived at when one's eyes are in working order, when

the conditions of perception are right (right for

percept ion

1

)

,

and when others of one's mental faculties are

in working order and not being unduly influenced by, say,

wishful thinking.

It is hard to imagine how Stalnaker is

going to be able to cover this ground without using

intentional notions.

One tack to take would be to appeal to

some notion of best future or best alternative world, where
'best' would be cashed out by some normative notion that is

.

131

not epistemic

.

But what normative notion?

Something like

maximization of happiness or flourishing obviously
will not
do, since false beliefs can contribute to
one's well-being,
(and can do so systematically rather than
occasionally and

accidentally

)

What then?

Some have looked to evolutionary theory.

Millikan and others have studied the suggestion that, as
Fodor puts it, Darwin might pull Brentano
the fire ([Fodor, 1989]).

1

s

chestnuts out of

The idea is that our belief-

forming mechanisms are selected to yield beliefs with true
content.

A belief or thought of

a

given type has its

content in virtue of the fact that tokens of that type are

reliably caused by such contents.

For example, thoughts to

the effect that such-and-such is a dog are reliably caused

by dogs, on this view.

Stalnaker does not discuss this

option, but one can imagine ways of combining it with his

theory: maybe the role of optimality should be played, not

by a normative notion, but simply by a maximization notion
of some kind, which would be spelled out (for belief-in-

general) ultimately in terms of maximization of offspring.

Fodor argues against the evolutionary theory in
[Fodor, 1989].

He says that such a theory of content of

belief cannot solve the 'disjunction problem'.

problem is this.

Suppose thought

i^s

Briefly, the

such that dog-thoughts

are about dogs in virtue of a lawlike regularity to the

effect that it's dogs that cause dog-thought tokens.

How

then can one be mistaken in thinking that such-and-such is

a

.
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dog?

If only dogs cause dog-thoughts, one
can't.

view proposed.)

(-On the

And if some non-dogs cause dog-thoughts

(e.g., cats-on-a-dark-night might cause
dog-thoughts), the

thought that such-and-such is

a

dog would have this as its

content: such-and-such is either a dog or

a

cat on a dark

night

Fodor

s

claim is that the fine logical grain of content

is too fine to be captured by the coarse grain of
causation-

by-things-of-kind-K.

Clearly this is right.

following illustration: suppose we have

Fodor uses the

a frog that snaps at

certain small black items moving in its environment.

One

story that can be told about this is that the frog's

snapping mechanism normally resonates to flies and (given
the theory of content we are working with) a certain type of

neural state of the frog, speaking broadly, means 'here's

a

Another story that can be told is that the fly's

fly'.

snapping mechanism normally resonates to little ambient

black things, which in the frog's environment are almost
always flies, and a certain type of neural state of the frog

means
it,

'here's a little ambient black thing'.

Darwin does not care which story you tell.

As Fodor puts
The point is

that there is no Darwinian fact of the matter about whether
the neural state of the frog resonates to flies or little

ambient black things or about whether it means 'here's
fly' or

'here's a little ambient black thing'.

no Darwinian fact of the matter about belief.

much more sophisticated discussion in [1989].)

a

And there is
(Cf. Fodor 's

133

The only conceivable way out

I

can see for the

proponent of the evolutionary theory of content is
to limit
the generality of the proposal severely and say
that

it is a

theory of actual content.

The concepts do£ and cat-on-a-

dark -night in fact are distinguishable, one might say,
and
one might challenge Fodor to produce an actual example of a
concept, Py that has the content P— or— Q.
not be able to.

Of course he will

-But such a theory will presumably not be

of much interest.

I

take it Stalnaker is not just after

a

generalization that covers the history of actual belief and
actual content, but one that tells us something about what
(naturalized) belief and content are.

(Although exactly

what he takes the generality of his proposal to be is far
from clear.

We will discuss this below.)

So there is

a

hole in Stalnaker

's

theory, and for

someone who is interested in comparing Stalnaker and Field,
it occurs at a crucial spot.

We cannot simply say, yes,

Stalnaker has shown us how to wash all the intentionality
out, and Field has not.

The two of them must be regarded as

tied at this point.

Stalnaker holds the view that necessarily equivalent

propostions are identical, and since this leads easily to
various unintuitive consequences, critics often seize on it
to generate criticisms.

generate

a

Field tries in such

a

way to

claim that Stalnaker has extra intentionality in

his theory where Field does not.

He focuses on the notion

of deliberation and gives an example where someone
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deliberates about accomplishing two different,
but
unbeknowst to him, impossible tasks (trisecting
a

Euclidean

60 degree angle by straight edge and
compass and producing

an example of a plane map that requires
more than four

colors to color).

The different deliberations could lead to

different behavior, clearly.

Field holds that the language-

approach can be used to explain deliberation

without invoking any intentionality

,

while Stalnaker will

have to appeal to an intentional notion to explain
deliberation.

(See [1986b], pp. 100-101).

Deliberation for

Stalnaker involves the weighing of possibilities.

This

requires representing the possibilities, says Field, an

intentional notion.

Field would prefer to see deliberation

construed as the weighing of states of affairs that are
epistemical ly possible for the agent, which in turn would be

construed as the weighing of state-of-af f air representations

which are treated by the agent as consistent.

This latter

notion can be spelled out in terms of the treatment of the

representations in thought.
Field says that Stalnaker cannot handle the case above

without invoking the notion of representing a possibility,
which he takes to be irretrievably intentional for Stalnaker
([1986], p.101).

He does not say why he thinks this.

Let's

consider ordinary deliberation first, then deliberation
about impossible tasks.

It is perhaps not completely clear

how beliefs about what's possible fit into Stalnaker
picture of belief, but let's suppose that they do.

's

There is

)

)

'
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no need to posit any extra representation
for deliberation

beyond what is embodied in believing things
like
to the movies or

cheaper, but

I

'I

can go

can go to a concert, the movie is

really like the Chiffons, although they

I

aren t as good as they used to be since Ronette
lef t

.

.

.

(

etc

Impossible tasks are seemingly different,

.

.

though: presumably trisecting a Euclidean 60 degree angle by

edge and compass and producing an example of

a

plane map that requires more than four colors to color are
the same task.

although

'I

Here what Stalnaker should say is that

wonder if

I

can trisect ...( etc .)

if

I

'I

wonder whether to draw

can produce a plane map.

.

.

'I

wonder

are the same question,

(etc.

a grid'

and

and

'I

wonder whether to

use the compass first or the straightedge' are not: the

parts of the deliberations may be different.

Will Measurement Theory Do What Stalnaker Wants?

Let's examine Stalnaker

Fundamental to

a

's

measurement model.

system of measurement using numbers is

a

similarity of structure between properties of physical
objects and properties of numbers.
example.

Consider weight, for

Physical objects can weigh more and less than

other physical objects.
than other numbers.

Numbers can be greater and less

If two objects have determinate

weights, then they have a determinate weight when combined.
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Two numbers added together yield another number
as their
unique sum. And so on.

There is

a

simple way to capture the notion of

similarity of structure set-theoretically
system <A, Rl...Rn> be
defined on that set
system,

a set

Let a relation

plus one or more relations

A homomorphism from one relation

.

Rl...Rn>, into another,

<A,

.

<B,

Sl...Sn> is a

mapping, h, that meets the following requirements:

(i)

for

each element a of A, there is an element b of B such that
h a
(

— b,

)

there is
al

.

.

h al

)

(

.

and (ii) for each relation R in the first system,

relation

a

S

in the second system such that for any

an in A, if R relates al...an, then S relates
.

.

.h ( an

)

.

Real numbers can measure weight because

there is a homomorphism from the physical objects, plus

certain relations on them, into the real numbers, plus
certain relations on them.

For example, the fact that

George's weight is less than Bill's is correlated with 200

being less than 250.
Here

I

have three points to make.

The first is that

assuming the measurement model is explanatory, Stalnaker has
no advantage over Field.

Read aright, Field's theory

explains intentionality on the measurement model as much as

Stalnaker
is not

by_

's

does.

The second is that the measurement model

itself very illuminating.

Measurement

iss

closely

analogous to linguistic intentionality and mental
intentionality, but the analogies are so close that

questions about measurement can be raised that parallel

)
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traditional questions about language and about mental
attitudes.

Finally, it is unclear exactly what Stalnaker

takes the two relational systems to be in the case of
mental
intent ionality

Field

s

.

Let's look at these points in turn.

exemplar truth definition contains

a

very

simple syntax and semantics for which there is a

homomorphism from

a

relational system composed of syntactic

objects plus (grammatical) operations on them into

a

relational system composed of individuals and properties
plus certain relations between them.

If the fact of a

certain kind of similarity of structure is alone enough to
explain intentionality

,

then Field's theory, at least as far

as his exemplar definition goes,

Stalnaker

's.

is as explanatory as

(Indeed, Field himself notes the measurement

theory analogy.
But how explanatory is Stalnaker' s?

the word

by it.

Stalnaker uses

'explain' quite a bit without saying what he means
In what sense does measurement theory explain the

relationship between George and 200?

Does measurement

theory tell us what it is for George to have his weight

correlated by a system of measurement with the number 200?
This is open to question, and even if it does, one can also

think of other kinds of 'explanation': back in history, the

pound was declared a standard unit by someone with enough
influence that people accepted this as one of their

conventions about measurement, the convention spread,

eventually George was born into

a

world where the convention

)
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holds, he grew to a certain size, etc..

One can also

imagine other types of question and explanation: why
do we

have pounds, why is

a

unit of just that size so useful?

(Does it have something to do with our own size,
perceptual

abilites,

and powers of manipulating objects?)

Why is it

evolutionarily advantageous to have such finely structured

measurement systems as we do?

Stalnaker wants to balance

the theory of intentionality on the back of measurement
theory, but what kind of theory does he take it to be, and
on what is measurement theory balanced?

(Stalnaker is

pointing to the structure of intentionality when he invokes
the measurement model.

We did the same thing in an earlier

chapter: we said, as if it were noteworthy, that truth was

structural notion.

a

It was noteworthy, not as an

'explanation* of truth, but as an attempt to get at the

essential properties of truth.
Our second point was that the analogies between

intentionality and measurement are so close that similar
questions arise for measurement as arise for intentionality.
For example, these two questions appear to be parallel: in

what does the determination of an extension for
e.g.

'gold', consist?

a

predicate,

In what does the determination of a

basic unit, e.g., the pound consist?

The question whether

one can unilaterally name things 'Charlie' has an analogue
in the question whether one can institute the

system all by oneself: a quound is

a

'quound'

half of a pound.

you weigh 200 pounds, you weigh 400 quounds.

—Is this

(If

139

statement true ?

)

Questions about compositionality have

(somewhat fuzzy) analogue in this puzzle:
a

a

is the weight of

whole a function of the weights of its parts?

But what

about two parts that would explode if put together?

Finally, any disputes about the conventionality of language

win

have close analogues in the realm of measurement, which

also involves convention.

Now let
"

[t ]he

s

look at the third problem.

analogy suggests that to define

person or

a

physical object and

a

a

Stalnaker said,
relation between

a

proposition is to define

a

class of properties with a structure that makes it possible
to pick one of the properties out of the class by specifying
a

proposition" ([1984], p.ll).

systems Stalnaker has in mind?

What are the two relational
This much is clear:

'George

weighs 200 pounds' is supposed to be analogous to 'George
believes that snow is white'.

Intuitively, the number 200

represents George's weight, and the numeral '200'

derivatively (through a separate homomorphism from syntax to
semantics of Mathematicalese

)

represents George's weight.

would agree that the clause 'snow is white' -the syntactic
object- represents, as directly or as derivatively as you
like, one of George's beliefs, but does the proposition

represent either his belief that snow is white or his

believing that snow is white?

Or maybe there is a

conglomerate object consisting in the proposition plus
George that does?

It is all very unclear.

Something seems

I
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to be backwards: we want the belief-event
to represent the
proposition ( al content), not the other way
around.

The Pro blem of Variegated Representation

We saw in the previous chapter that fitting all
the
various kinds of mental representation under the
umbrella of

Mentalese was

a

problem for Field.

It is not a problem for

Stalnaker, and this constitutes one of the clearest

advantages of his theory over Field's.

If Mary believes

that a certain tree is green in virtue of a visual

perception of a certain scene, we can characterize this on
Stalnaker

1

s

view simply by saying Mary is in

that, under optimal conditions,
is green,

a

belief state

she is only in if the tree

and under optimal conditions, she is in that

belief state either because the tree is green or because of
something that entails it.

We do not require that a

specific sentence (presumably isomorphic to 'the tree is
green') be betokened.

We set up as a desideratum that

a

theory that claims to

be a theory of mental intentionality must show belief to be

continuous with other mental concepts, and not just

propositional ones.
Stalnaker?

We failed to see Field do this.

Things look promising:

a

Can

vague feeling of

happiness has causes, and ranges of kinds or strengths of
happiness may well correlate with ranges of degrees of some

.
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property or properties relevant to causing happiness.
may well work out, on Stalnaker

's

It

theory, that feelings of

happiness indicate the presence of an instantiation of
certain properties.

Would the feelings of happiness

represent or perhaps be about the instance of the properties
on Stalnaker's view?

There is not enough in the statement

of the theory to answer this question, but there seem to be
no serious threat from this direction.

Stalnaker does not

intend all indication to be representation, and he probably
does not intend all representation to be aboutness (in our

narrow sense).

There is no reason in principle why the

required distinctions cannot be made.
But there is

perhaps capture

flip side to all this.

a

Stalnaker can

continuous spectrum of mental properties

a

and relations while Field cannot, but he apparently misses

something Field can capture: the similarities between

certain kinds of mental intentionality and linguistic

intentionality

.

That Field's theory is

a

serious contender

as a theory of intentionality is a testament to this

similarity
Lewis's theory of linguistic intentionality, which

Stalnaker endorses, is rooted in this definition: an
expression

S

means

a

thing

x

in a language L iff there is a

population of speakers among whom it is
S

to mean x.

(Using S to mean

x

right kind of Gricean intentions.
saw,

a

convention to use

is a matter of having the

Cf. Lewis [1975].)

As we

exactly how Stalnaker is using the measurement model is
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unclear.

But we can perhaps say this: if the Lewis-

Stalnaker view of linguistic intentionality
cannot be fitted
to the measurement model, then Stalnaker cannot
explain the
similarity of mental and linguistic intentionality.
If it

can, then the measurement model covers too
much to be very

explanatory on its own

.

There are homomorphisms everywhere.

Surely the extended homomorphism between

a

representational

system and what it represents is relevant to explanation,
but surely it is not the whole story.

Belief

Neither Field nor Schiffer thinks Stalnaker gets belief
right.

Schiffer

's

somewhat testy summary of the account of

belief goes as follows:
There is some optimality condition C which
perhaps never obtains (though it could obtain)
and which is specifiable in wholly non-intentional
and materialistically adequate terms, such that
x believes p iff x is in a belief state that,
under optimal conditions, x is in only if p is
true, and under optimal conditions, x is in that
belief state because p is true, or because some
proposition which entails p is true.
([1986] p.93)

Both Field and Schiffer bring forward the problem of error,
(which we saw Fodor argue cannot be solved by this

approach).

Field says,

"The obvious problem with making

belief literally a species of indication is that most people
are unreliable about a great many things" ([1986], p.107).
He goes so far as to suggest that this may be the exception
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rather than the rule.

Schiffer mentions the problem of

qualitative duplicates: it is possible to have

a

case where,

even though conditions are optimal, one still is
mistaken

because an indistinguishable duplicate has been
substituted
for the object one thinks one is having a belief
about.

Stalnaker makes three main points in his reply to Field
and Schiffer (See [Stalnaker, 1986].): First, there is

a

fair amount of reliability about such homely matters as 'the

lights are on'.

very often:

Second, normal conditions need not obtain

'normal' and 'usual' are not the same.

person always represents vis

a

Third, a

vis a range of possibilities.

In the case of qualitative duplicates -e.g.,

suppose someone

has substituted a duplicate for Fido sleeping on the rugthe idea that Fido is a duplicate is not, except in certain

special circumstances, among the relevant possibilities.

These replies do not constitute
(even supposing Fodor

generalized).

'

s

a

very strong defense

impossibility argument could not be

To take the first point first, sheer quantity

of reliability is irrelevant (this point applies to both

Stalnaker and Field, who should not have made the objection
in the first place).

The question is, is it criterial of

belief s-in-general that they be caused, under optimal
conditions, by the things in the world that make them true

?

(We grant that belief states are alternative possible states

of people.)

Unless optimal conditions include ideal

epistemic faculties, the answer would seem to be no.

Some

people believe in UFO's, some believe the future can be seen

)
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in the stars,

some believe they lived as Cleopatra in a

previous life, some believe that Elvis is alive
and hidden
away somewhere. These beliefs might be true,
(i.e.,

epistemically possible for us that there is

a

it is

future in

which they turn out to have been true), but it
seems plain
that even if they are, they are not (at least in most

cases)

caused in the way suggested: rather, these beliefs seem
to

originate in various kinds of desires.

If on the other

hand, optimal conditions do include ideal epistemic

faculties, Stalnaker seems to be drifting pretty far from

a

naturalistic account of belief.
Now let's look at Stalnaker

's

second point.

He says

that normal conditions need not obtain very often and that

normal

1

and

'usual* are not the same.

epistemic and objective normality.

Let's distinguish

Certainly, a

perceptually indistinguishable duplicate dog would not be
epistemically normal.

But Stalnaker presumably does not

want to be using an intentional notion like epistemic
normalcy.

Who is to say that

a

duplicate dog being slipped

in is not objectively normal, even if it only happens once?
(One wonders whether there is a non-epistemic conception of

normalcy connected with our intuitive everyday uses of the

word 'normal'.

E.g., when weather-forecasters talk about

temperatures being normal, they clearly are excluding

consideration of such long periods of time as include the
Ice Age

.
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Stalnaker

s

third point was that one selects one's

beliefs from an antecedently or concurrently given
range of
possibilities. That the dog on one's rug is a duplicate
insinuated into one's household is not generally among the
range of possible options.

First, this is among the options

available to rational adults aware of cases of trickery and
illusion, even though the probability we assign to it may be

very low.
error.

Second, this does not answer the problem of

Error arises not only when one selects from

a

truncated range of possibilities, but when one selects from
a

full range as well.

A second objection comes from Pendlebury ([1986]), who
says
...I consider the notion of indication far too
crude to pin down the contents of belief in general.
The contents of perceptual beliefs (and perhaps some
others that are closely related to them) may be
propositions which the states in question indicate.
But this is surely not true of all beliefs, and
especially not general beliefs which are only
very indirectly connected with experience, for
such beliefs are typically not caused by states of
affairs which they represent.
([1986, p.231])
I

guess an example of the sort of general proposition

Pendlebury has in mind would be this:
electrical charge'.

'ions have an

He also mentions disjunctions, which he

thinks have no causal powers.

With respect to disjunctions,

one can perhaps say that disjunctive beliefs always arise

from external plus internal causes (maybe facts plus

internal disjoining).

Stalnaker

's

Pendlebury seems to think that

view somehow rules out internal mental

causation, but there is no reason why one's

'environment'

)
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cannot include previous states of one's own mind.

(Granted,

Stalnaker ought to say more about environment: this
is
another gap in the theory.
al_l

Also, beliefs cannot represent

their causes, and since causes thus have to be selected

anyway, one can imagine various refinements of the theory

based on selection of causes.)

With respect to general propositions, it is
unclear what Pendlebury's criticism amounts to.

a

little

Like Field,

Stalnaker focuses on deductive relationships among beliefs
rather than inductive ones, and certainly one can ask about

inductive relationships, but there is no reason to think
there is no answer.

It is not at all clear how one is

caused to generalize empirically, but, Pendlebury would
surely agree, causality is involved.

We might say something

like this: an empirical belief is caused, under optimal

conditions, either by what makes the belief true or by the

apprehension of states of affairs from which the belief in

question is a good inductive consequence (plus whatever it
is that motivates us to draw inductive conclusions).

Again,

if internal causation were ruled out in principle by

Stalnaker'
I

s

theory, this would be a problem, but it isn't.

don't see that Pendlebury has a clear objection here.

(Pendlebury seems to be worried about the fact that a

future-directed belief may not represent the future as it

actually turns out to be.
always

a

Well, the problem of induction is

problem, but it is rather unfair to ask Stalnaker

to solve both it and the problem of intentionality

.
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A third objection is raised by both
Field and

Pendlebury.

They think Stalnaker does not have enough

structure in his account of consequence and other
logical
relations to account for reasoning.
Field suggests
that

reasoning essentially involves rules of reasoning and
that
when Stalnaker gets around to accounting for reasoning
by
rules, he will have to go beyond the boolean structure he

posits.

I

see no reason why one must use rules in one's

reasoning, and

I

see no reason why when one does, they

require more than the boolean structure to explain, as long
as they are syntactic rules

(Field does not say).

If they

are not syntactic rules, Field should first explain his

conception of rule, and then we will see if there is an

objection to Stalnaker.

Belief Attribution

We saw that Field had some problems because his account
of belief did not accord with certain intuitions about

belief attribution.

The two problems we looked at were the

problem of equivalent sentences and the problem of the point
of view of the attributer.

Stalnaker has an elaborate

theory of belief attribution, and we will see whether he
does better than Field.

According to Stalnaker,
between a person and

a

'believes' expresses a relation

proposition,

a

proposition being

a
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set of worlds (or a set of circumstances on
some versions of
his theory; we'll use worlds).
The myriad problems that

arise in explaining belief attribution "arise from
the

context-dependence of belief attribution; their solution
belongs to

a

pragmatics of belief" ([1985], p.l).

The most

important ingredient of Stalnaker's view is his notion of
context set.

He pictures a discourse or conversation as

taking place relative to

a

context set, which contains all

the propositions recognized to be 'live options' by the

participants in the conversation at

a

given time.

We say

that propositions true in all the worlds are presupposed by
the participants.

If a proposition is true in some, but not

all, of the worlds in the context set, then it may be

asserted.

When an assertion is made, the content of what is

asserted is added to the context set in the following sense:
all the propositions incompatible with what is asserted are

kicked out.

It is important to note that the above is

supposed to be

a

theory of conventional presupposition, not

of what the participants actually mentally presuppose: the

participants may be being deceptive and not actually believe
the things their words conventionally presuppose.
In [1985], Stalnaker introduces the notion of a derived

context, used for attitude attribution.

"What Phoebe

believes, or is assumed to believe, may be different from,
or incompatible with, what a speaker talking about Phoebe's

beliefs believes or assumes" ([1985], pp. 11-12).

postulate

a

So we

derived context set, determined as follows: "for
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each possible situation in the basic context,
Phoebe will be
a definite belief state which is
itself defined by a set

m

of possible situations - the ones compatible with
what

Phoebe believes in that possible situation.

The union of

all the possible belief states will [be] the
set of all

possible situations that might, for all the speaker
presupposes, be compatible with Phoebe's beliefs" ([1985],
p. 12)

.

The two problems we raised for Field were the problem
of equivalent sentences and the problem of the point of view

of the attributer
for Stalnaker

.

.

There are analogues of these problems

Instead of the problem of equivalent

sentences, Stalnaker has the problem of necessarily

equivalent sentences.

Stalnaker is well known for biting

the bullet with respect to this problem.

He has said

various things to try to make the view more palatable.
not going to enter into this.

The bullet is still

and it still has teeth-marks on it.

I

am

bullet,

Stalnaker is clearly

denying a basic intuition (not that that is
to do).

a

I

a

terrible thing

merely mention the problem here for the purposes

of comparison with Field, and the two of them are on a par
in that each must face a version of this problem.

The second problem was the problem of the point of view
of the attributer.

We saw the following sentence was

problematic for Field: Mary believes that her ugly old
flatware is going to win

a

prize at the Antiques Show.

e

)

.
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There is

related problem for Stalnaker.

a

Let me give

an overly vivid example to illustrate
it, then a more

ordinary one.

Suppose

I

believe that all pieces of fruit

are aliens from outer space and that the fruit
on earth

comprises all the aliens on earth.

I

have tried repeatedly

to warn others about this insidious infiltration,
but no one

believes me, and
I

I

am aware of this (the foolsl).

always make a point of calling fruit ’aliens'.

However,
On the

basis of George having told me there is fruit in the
fridge,

report to you, who know all about my little peculiarity,
'George believes some aliens are in the fridge'.
I

(Note that

may not myself believe George and so may not be willing to
the de r

claim 'There are some aliens George

believes to be in the fridge

'

Now, according to

.

Stalnaker, the derived acceptance set contains the worlds

consistent with what

I

suppose George to believe.

none of those worlds are there aliens in the fridge
A more ordinary example would be this.

But in
1

Consider

Thelma, who believes stubbornly and falsely that the trees
on Main St. are beeches.
elms.

Suppose we know that they are

Suppose she says to you

"I

saw some people from the

Public Works Department out on Main St. today, and
they are going to take down some beeches".
report to me,

I

think

You may well

'Thelma thinks the Public Works Department is

going to take down some elms on Main St

.
'

This example is

problematic in a way similar to the previous one.
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Here is

possible reply for Stalnaker.

a

Stalnaker

originally set out to explicate something we might call
conventional presupposition, as opposed to speaker
presupposition.

participants in

His context sets track, not what the
a

conversation actually presuppose, but what

they speak as if they presupposed, given our linguistic

conventions.

Thus when an adult says to a child 'What did

Santa bring you for Christmas?' he speaks as if he

presupposes Santa exists.

Conventional presupposition is

(apparently) tied somehow to semantic meaning, while speaker

presupposition is not.

Stalnaker might want to extend this

distinction to the derived context set as well.

He might

say that the conventional derived presuppositions of 'George

believes some aliens are in the fridge' include one to the
effect that, as the speaker seemingly supposes, George

believes in aliens, although the speaker may not in fact
suppose this.

But consider our second example ('Thelma

thinks that the Public Works Department is going to take
down some elms on Main St.').

The situation described is

common enough that it just isn't one of the normal

conventional (derived) presuppositions of the sentence that

Thelma thinks there are elms on Main St.

At best this may

be a conventional presupposition in certain situations: when
the focus of the conversation is Thelma's beliefs, for

example.

In other situations,

it is not;

for example, when

the focus is on the tree-destroying predilections of the
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Public Works Department.

(I

believe that the same remarks

apply to the first example.)
The two families of problems about belief attribution

equivalence and point of view, can each produce

a

problem

for Stalnaker and for Field.

Conclusions

We have seen that Field does not fare very well when

held up against our list of desiderata from Chapter One.
Does Stalnaker fare any better?
Does Stalnaker get rid of the intentionality?

He needs

to fill out his concept of optimality before we can be sure,
and above we saw reason to be doubtful.

Does he get the

mentalism out?

Stalnaker

The same remarks apply.

's

theory

is organized in a much more sophisticated way than Field's:

He does not take belief as the basic mental attitude, and he

does produce the outlines, at least, of a theory of more

basic mental representation.

Is there hope of making belief

continuous with other mental concepts?
Stalnaker'

s

There's more hope on

theory than Field's: all mentalistic concepts do

seem to involve a range of different possible states of an

organism that are evoked by one's environment, even feeling
happy

,

but the price to pay may be attenuation of the

measurement model or failure to explain linguistic
intentionality (or,

I

guess, to give up the Lewis approach).

Is Stalnaker 's treatment of belief consonant with what is
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known about belief attribution?
similar problems here.

Field and Stalnaker have

Is the claim of a physicalistic

basis made plausible in some way and not merely asserted?

Stalnaker just takes over Field's project without trying to
argue for it.

Neither Stalnaker nor Field gives us decisive

answers to the controversial questions.

Something in

particular that both of them pretty much ignore is the
question whether representation must be representation for
someone, and whether, if so, this can be spelled out

naturalist ically.
Stalnaker

's

theory is far more sophisticated than

Field's, which has the air of a first shot, but it does not
do a significantly better job of naturalizing

intentionality

Neither makes

.

a

convincing case using the

example of belief that he has solved 'the problem of

intentionality'.

One problem

I

have tripped over again and

again is that neither author makes clear what he thinks the

problem of intentionality is.

Most of us already believe

that mental and linguistic processes are accompanied in a

regular way by physical processes.

biconditional with

'X

So a mere material

believes that p' or

'S

means that p'

on one side and something describing physicalistic states on

the other is not of all that much interest.

Neither

Stalnaker nor Field is offering anything as interesting as,
say, an analysis of belief.
'

supervenience

'

The words 'reduction' and

sometimes appear in discussion, but no

attempt is made to show that

a

reduction can actually be

.
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effected or

a

supervenience relation defined.

No claim of

lawlikeness is made (-appropriately, since the relevant

empirical investigations have not been made).

Field and

Stalnaker use 'account' and 'explanation', but neither says

what he means by these expressions.
Stalnaker puts forward

a

Neither Field nor

conception of what he is doing that

would rule out, say, using the seemingly silly strategy

I

invoked above in defense against Fodor or the related

strategy invoked in an earlier chapter of taking seriously
the orientation to the actual world of

a

counterf actual that

appears in (our revised version of) Field's definition.

So

on these grounds alone, it is very hard to say that either

has solved the problem of intentionality

Will truth-characteriztions have any role to play in
explaining intentionality naturalistically
project turns out to be?

,

whatever that

Truth for denotational languages

and maybe even for other kinds is an intentional notion, so
the concept of truth as such ought not have a role in

explaining basic intentionality.

As we noted earlier,

something common to truth and measurement and linguistic

intentionality and mental intentionality, namely an extended

parallelism of structure, is surely going to be relevant,
but until someone says what explaining intentionality

naturalistically is, we will not know how it is relevant or
what else is relevant.

.

.

.
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